This case is before the Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
On Tuesday, November 7, 2000, the State of Florida, along with the rest of the nation, conducted a general election for the President of the United States. The Florida Division of Elections ("Division") reported on Wednesday, November 8, that Governor George W. Bush, the Republican candidate, had received 2,909,135 votes and Vice President Albert Gore Jr., the Democratic candidate, had received 2,907,351 votes. Because the overall difference in the total votes cast for each candidate was less than one-half of one percent of the total votes cast for that office, an automatic recount was conducted.
A. The Manual Recounts
In light of the closeness of the election, the Florida Democratic Executive Committee, on Thursday, November 9, requested that manual recounts be conducted in Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties. The county canvassing boards ("Boards") of these counties conducted sample manual recounts of at least one percent of the ballots cast. Several of the Boards determined that the manual recounts showed "an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election," and the Boards voted to conduct countywide manual recounts. See § 102.166(5), Fla. Stat. (2000).
Because the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board was concerned that the recounts would not be completed prior to the seven-day deadline set forth in sections 102.111 and 102.112, Florida Statutes (2000), the Board sought an advisory opinion from the Division. The Division issued Advisory Opinion DE 00-10 wherein the Division advised the Board that absent unforeseen circumstances the county's returns must be received by 5 p.m. on the seventh day following the election in order to be included in the certification of statewide results.
Relying on this advisory opinion, the Florida Secretary of State ("Secretary") on Monday, November 13, issued a statement wherein she announced that she would ignore returns of manual recounts received by the Florida Department of State ("Department") after 5 p.m., Tuesday, November 14. The Volusia County Canvassing Board on Monday, November 13, filed suit in circuit court in Leon County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the candidates and the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board were allowed to intervene.
B. The Legal Proceedings
The trial court ruled on Tuesday, November 14, that the deadline was mandatory but that the Volusia Board could amend its returns at a later date and that the Secretary, after "considering all attendant facts and circumstances," could exercise her discretion in determining whether to ignore the amended returns. Later that day, the Volusia Board filed a notice of appeal and the Palm Beach Board filed a notice of joinder in the appeal.
Subsequent to the circuit court's order, the Secretary announced that she was in receipt of certified returns (i.e., the returns resulting from the initial recount) from all counties in the state. The Secretary then instructed Florida's Supervisors of Elections ("Supervisors") that they must submit to her by 2 p.m., Wednesday, November 15, a written statement of "the facts and circumstances" justifying any belief on their part that they should be allowed to amend the certified returns previously filed. After considering the reasons in light of specific criteria,
On Thursday, November 16, the Florida Democratic Party and Vice President Gore filed a motion in circuit court in Leon County, seeking to compel the Secretary to accept amended returns. After conducting a hearing, the court denied relief in a brief order dated Friday, November 17. Both the Democratic Party and Vice President Gore appealed. The First District Court of Appeal certified both of the underlying trial court orders to this Court via the Court's "pass-through" jurisdiction. By orders dated Friday, November 17, this Court accepted jurisdiction, set an expedited briefing schedule, and enjoined the Secretary and the Elections Canvassing Commission ("Commission") from certifying
This Court on Tuesday, November 21, issued an opinion reversing the trial court's order based on the following analysis: Due to several ambiguities in the Florida Election Code ("Code"), the Court determined that legislative intent as discerned through traditional rules of statutory construction dictated a remedy based on the particular facts of this case.
The questions before this Court include the following: Under what circumstances may a Board authorize a countywide manual recount pursuant to section 102.166(5); and under what circumstances should the Secretary and Commission accept such recounts when the returns are certified and submitted by the Board after the seven-day deadline set forth in sections 102.111 and 102.112?
III. THE APPLICABLE LAW
A fundamental principle governing presidential election law in the United States is set forth in article II, section 1, United States Constitution, which confers on state legislatures the power to regulate the appointment of presidential electors:
U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court explained the import of this clause vis-a-vis state constitutions:
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25, 13 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892).
Although the Constitution vested the power to appoint the presidential electors "in such Manner as the Legislature... may direct," McPherson also made clear that the electors
McPherson, 146 U.S. at 34-35, 13 S.Ct. 3 (emphasis added). In this State, at least since 1847, the right to elect the President of the United States has been firmly vested in the citizens of this State by the Legislature. As section 103.011, Florida Statutes (2000), provides:
The United States Congress also has provided that where any dispute concerning the appointment of electors is settled at least six days prior to the date set for the meeting of electors and is done so pursuant to state laws enacted prior to the date of election, the state's conclusion concerning the settlement of such disputes is conclusive:
3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) (emphasis added). Consistent with the above provisions of federal law and with longstanding principles of state law, the Florida Legislature in 1951 enacted the Florida Election Code, contained in chapters 97-106, Florida Statutes (2000), which sets forth uniform criteria regulating elections in this state and which provides methods and procedures, including judicial methods and procedures, for the final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of this state.
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Legislative intent-as always-is the polestar that guides a court's inquiry into the provisions of the Florida Election Code. See Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Ass'n v. Florida Div. of Admin. Hearings, 686 So.2d 1349 (Fla.1997). Where the language of the Code is clear and amenable to a reasonable and logical interpretation, courts are without power to diverge from the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the plain language of the Code. See Starr Tyme, Inc. v. Cohen, 659 So.2d 1064 (Fla.1995). As noted above, however, chapter 102 is unclear and in conflict in several respects. In light of these ambiguities, the Court must resort to traditional rules of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. See Capers v. State, 678 So.2d 330 (Fla.1996).
V. LEGAL OPINION OF THE DIVISION OF ELECTIONS
The first issue this Court must resolve is whether a County Board may conduct a countywide manual recount where it determines there is an error in vote tabulation that could affect the outcome of the election. Here, the Division issued opinion DE 00-13, which construed the language "error in vote tabulation" to exclude the situation where a discrepancy between the original machine return and sample manual recount is due to the manner in which a ballot has been marked or punched.
Pursuant to section 102.166(4)(a), a candidate who appears on a ballot, a political committee that supports or opposes an issue that appears on a ballot, or a political party whose candidate's name appeared on the ballot may file a written request with the County Board for a manual recount This request must be filed with the Board before the Board certifies the election results or within seventy-two hours after the election, whichever occurs later.
§ 102.166(5)(a)-(c), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).
The issue in dispute here is the meaning of the phrase "error in the vote tabulation" found in section 102.166(5). The Division opines that an "error in the vote tabulation" only means a counting error resulting from incorrect election parameters or an error in the vote tabulating software. We disagree.
The plain language of section 102.166(5) refers to an error in the vote tabulation rather than the vote tabulation system. On its face, the statute does not include any words of limitation; rather, it provides a remedy for any type of mistake made in tabulating ballots. The Legislature has utilized the phrase "vote tabulation system" and "automatic tabulating equipment" in section 102.166 when it intended to refer to the voting system rather than the vote count. Equating "vote tabulation" with "vote tabulation system" obliterates the distinction created in section 102.166 by the Legislature.
Sections 101.5614(5) and (6) also support the proposition that the "error in vote tabulation" encompasses more than a mere determination of whether the vote tabulation system is functioning. Section 101.5614(5) provides that "[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing board." Conversely, section 101.5614(6) provides that any vote in which the Board cannot discern the intent of the voter must be discarded. Taken together, these sections suggest that "error in the vote tabulation" includes errors in the failure of the voting machinery to read a ballot and not simply
Moreover, section 102.141(4), which outlines the Board's responsibility in the event of a recount, states that the Board "shall examine the counters on the machines or the tabulation of the ballots cast in each precinct in which the office or issue appeared on the ballot and determine whether the returns correctly reflect the votes cast." § 102.141, Fla. Stat. (2000). Therefore, an "error in the vote tabulation" includes a discrepancy between the number of votes determined by a vote tabulation system and the number of votes determined by a manual count of a sampling of precincts pursuant to section 102.166(4).
Although error cannot be completely eliminated in any tabulation of the ballots, our society has not yet gone so far as to place blind faith in machines. In almost all endeavors, including elections, humans routinely correct the errors of machines. For this very reason Florida law provides a human check on both the malfunction of tabulation equipment and error in failing to accurately count the ballots. Thus, we find that the Division's opinion DE 00-13 regarding the ability of county canvassing boards to authorize a manual recount is contrary to the plain language of the statute.
Having concluded that the county canvassing boards have the authority to order countywide manual recounts, we must now determine whether the Commission
VI. AMENDED RETURNS
A. Statutory Ambiguity
In regard to this case, the provisions of the Code are ambiguous in the following areas. First, the deadline for submitting county returns to the Department under sections 102.111 and 102.112 is in conflict with the time frame for conducting manual recounts under section 102.166(4).
1. The Recount Conflict
Section 102.166(1) states that "[a]ny candidate for nomination or election, or any elector qualified to vote in the election related to such candidacy, shall have the right to protest the returns of the election as being erroneous by filing with the appropriate canvassing board a sworn, written protest." The time period for filing a protest is "prior to the time the canvassing board certifies the results for the office being protested or within 5 days after midnight of the date the election is held, whichever occurs later." § 102.166(2), Fla. Stat. (2000).
Section 102.166(4)(a), the operative subsection in this case, further provides that, in addition to any protest, "any candidate whose name appeared on the ballot ... or any political party whose candidates' names appeared on the ballot may file a written request with the county canvassing board for a manual recount" accompanied by the "reason that the manual recount is being requested." Section
§ 102.166, Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).
A Board "may" authorize a manual recount
§ 102.166, Fla. Stat. (2000).
Under this scheme, a candidate can request a manual recount at any point prior to certification by the Board and such action can lead to a full recount of all the votes in the county. Although the Code sets no specific deadline by which
2. The "Shall" Versus "May" Conflict
Section 102.111, which sets forth general criteria governing the Elections Canvassing Commission, was enacted in 1951 as part of the Code and provides that late returns "shall" be ignored:
§ 102.111, Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).
The Legislature in 1989 revised chapter 102 to include section 102.112, which provides that late returns "may" be ignored and that members of the County Board "shall" be fined:
§ 102.112, Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added).
The above statutes conflict. Whereas section 102.111 is mandatory (i.e., the Department "shall" ignore late returns), section 102.112 is permissive (i.e., the Department "may" ignore late returns, or the Department "may" certify late returns and fine tardy Board members).
B. Resolving the Ambiguity
1. The Recount Conflict
It is well settled that a statute should be construed in its entirety and as a harmonious whole. See, e.g., Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla.1961). Further, where two laws are in conflict, courts should adopt an interpretation that harmonizes the laws, for the Legislature is presumed to have intended that both laws are to operate coextensively and have the fullest possible effect. See T.R. v. State, 677 So.2d 270 (Fla.1996). In the present case, whereas sections 102.111 and 102.112 state that County Boards must submit vote returns to the Department by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an election, section 102.166(4) provides that a manual recount can be requested at any point prior to certification. Manual recounts oftentimes may be incomplete on the seventh day following the election. In such a case, if the seven-day limit were to be strictly enforced, the manual recount provision would be eviscerated and rendered meaningless. The Legislature could not have intended such a result. The seven-day limit thus must be construed in a flexible manner to accommodate the manual recount provision.
2. The "Shall" Versus "May" Conflict
First, it is well settled that where two statutory provisions are in conflict, the specific statute controls the general statute. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. Vizzini, 227 So.2d 205 (Fla.1969). In the present case, whereas section 102.111 in its title and text addresses the general makeup and duties of the Elections Canvassing Commission, the statute only tangentially addresses the penalty for late returns, noting that such returns "shall" be ignored by the Department. Section 102.112, on the other hand, directly addresses in its title and text both the "deadline" for submitting returns and the "penalties" for submitting late returns; the statute expressly states that late returns "may" be ignored and that dilatory Board members "shall" be fined. Based on the precision of the title and text, section 102.112 constitutes a specific penalty statute that defines both the deadline for filing returns and the penalties for filing late returns, and section 102.111 constitutes a nonspecific statute in this regard. The specific statute controls the nonspecific statute.
Second, it also is well settled that when two statutes are in conflict, the more recently enacted statute controls the older statute. See McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45 (Fla.1994). In the present case, the provision in section 102.111 stating that the Department "shall" ignore late returns was enacted in 1951 as part of the Code. On the other hand, the penalty provision in section 102.112 stating that the Department "may" ignore late returns was enacted in 1989 as a revision to chapter 102. The more recently enacted provision may be viewed as the clearest and most recent expression of legislative intent.
Third, related statutory provisions must be read as a cohesive whole. See Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So.2d 735 (Fla.1961). A statutory provision will not be construed in such a way that it renders meaningless or absurd any other statutory provision. See Amente v. Newman, 653 So.2d 1030 (Fla.1995). As stated in Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992), "all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent
Section 102.166 states that a candidate, political committee, or political party may request a manual recount any time before the county canvassing board certifies the results to the Department and, if the initial manual recount indicates a significant error, the Board "shall" conduct a countywide manual recount in certain cases. Thus, if a request is filed on the sixth day following an election and a full manual recount is required, the Board, through no fault of its own, will be unable to submit its returns to the Department by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following the election. In such a case, if the mandatory provision in section 102.111 were given effect, the votes of the county would be ignored for the simple reason that the Board was following the dictates of a different section of the Code. The Legislature could not have intended to penalize county canvassing boards for following the dictates of the Code.
And finally, when the Legislature enacted the Code, it envisioned that all votes cast during a particular election, including absentee ballots, would be submitted to the Department at one time. This, of course, is not possible because our state statutory scheme has been superseded by federal law governing overseas voters;
VII. THE DEPARTMENT'S DISCRETION
Consistent with the analysis above, we conclude that section 102.112 grants the Department discretion to ignore returns not received by the time specified in the statute. However, a plain reading of section 102.112 does not set forth boundaries of the exercise of this discretion. This case is not about whether there is a 5 p.m. deadline for filing returns. There is such a deadline. The trial court enforced that deadline and all county canvassing boards met that deadline. This case is about the "may ignore" portion of the statute and whether the Department acted within its discretion when the Secretary of State anticipatorily announced that
In a statewide or federal election other than a presidential election we can foresee no reason why the Department would refuse to accept amended returns if a county was proceeding in good faith with a manual recount under section 102.166. However, in this case involving a presidential election, the decision as to when amended returns can be excluded from the statewide certification must necessarily be considered in conjunction with the contest provisions of section 102.168 and the deadlines set forth in 3 U.S.C. § 5. Therefore, in this case involving a presidential election, we conclude that the reasoned basis for the exercise of the Department's discretion to ignore amended returns is limited to those instances where failure to ignore the amended returns will: (1) preclude a candidate, elector, or taxpayer from contesting the certification of an election pursuant to section 102.168;
VIII. THE PRESENT CASE
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court below properly concluded that the county canvassing boards were required to submit their returns to the Department by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following the election and that the Department was not required to ignore the amended returns but rather could count them. The court, however, erred in holding that the Secretary acted within her discretion in prematurely rejecting any amended returns that would be the result of ongoing manual recounts. The Secretary's rationale for rejecting the Board's returns was as follows:
Letter from Katherine Harris to Palm Beach Canvassing Board (Nov. 15, 2000)(emphasis added).
We conclude that, consistent with the Florida election scheme, the Department may not reject a Board's amended returns that are filed on or before the day after the date that the overseas ballots are due. Such a rejection constitutes a clear abuse of discretion, as the Elections Canvassing Commission cannot certify the election prior to that date. Further, as set forth above, in this case involving a presidential election, the reasoned basis for the exercise of the Department's discretion to
Further, in this case, the Department applied its discretion in accord with a faulty premise: that an "error in vote tabulation" does not include a situation where a discrepancy between the original machine return and sample recount is due to the manner in which a ballot has been marked or punched. See Advisory Opinion DE 00-13. Accordingly, the Department did not exercise its discretion within the confines of the law. As a result of this opinion, Palm Beach County, and potentially other counties, were thwarted in their efforts to complete the manual recount. In this Court's original opinion, we granted a remedy which, in effect, put the parties in the same position they would have been at the time the Division issued its advisory opinion on Monday, November 13, 2000.
As is evident from the nature of the actual issue certified by the district court as one of great public importance requiring this Court's immediate attention, this Court has at all times been faced with a question of the statutory construction of Florida's election laws in accord with the intent of the Florida Legislature. Our examination of that issue has been limited to a determination of legislative intent as informed by the traditional sources and rules of construction we have long accepted as relevant in determining such intent. Not surprisingly, we have identified the right of Florida's citizens to vote and to have elections determined by the will of Florida's voters as important policy concerns of the Florida Legislature in enacting Florida's election code.
It is important, perhaps, to remind ourselves that the Florida Legislature has expressly vested in the voters of Florida the authority to elect the presidential electors who will ultimately participate in choosing a president:
§ 103.011, Fla. Stat. (2000). By providing for the popular election of presidential electors, Florida's Legislature has also placed that election under Florida's general statutory election scheme. Hence, there is essentially only one statutory election scheme for all elections whether the elections be for local and state officials or for presidential electors. The Legislature has not chosen to have a separate set of election laws for elections for presidential electors. The Legislature has chosen to have a single election code control all elections. So, we must interpret and apply that single election code here.
As a consequence of having a single election code for all elections, it should not be surprising to anyone to learn that these laws will be applied in most instances to elections other than those for presidential electors. For example, it is apparent that the court cases that have previously construed the election laws generally have involved state and local elections. It should not be surprising then that this Court's prior opinions that we have relied on for guidance in resolving the pending issue of statutory construction would have little reference to the Legislature's authority in the selecting of presidential electors or the Legislature's decision to grant Florida voters the right to elect presidential electors. In fact, the parties have provided us no citations to court cases in Florida involving disputes over presidential electors under Florida's election laws. This case may be the first.
In sum, Florida's statutory scheme simply makes no provision for applying its rules one way for presidential elector elections and another way for all other elections. That was a legislative decision that we have accepted. The importance of the single scheme becomes apparent when we consider the issue of the timetable for filing election returns in all elections where returns must be filed according to the statutory schedule. We have construed the provisions providing for a timetable as directory in light of what we perceive to be a clear legislative policy of the importance of an elector's right to vote and of having each vote counted. Hopefully, our unbroken line of cases identifying and relying on these legislative policies has not missed the mark. Further, if anything, more recent legislative changes have been crafted not only to be consistent with these policies, but also to ensure adherence to them.
Hence, based upon our perception of legislative intent, we have ruled that election returns must be accepted for filing unless it can clearly be determined that the late filing would prevent an election contest or the consideration of Florida's vote in a presidential election. This statutory construction reflects our view that the Legislature would not wish to endanger Florida's vote being counted in a presidential election. This ruling is not only consistent with our prior interpretation of the entire statutory election scheme, but also with our identification of the important legislative policies underlying that scheme.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the orders of the trial court. Based on this Court's status as the ultimate arbiter of conflicting Florida law, we conclude that our construction of the above statutes results in the formation of no new rules of state law but rather results simply in a narrow reading and clarification of those statutes, which were enacted long before the present election took place. We decline to rule more expansively in the present case, for to do so would result in
No motion for rehearing will be allowed.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
I dissent from issuing a new decision while the United States Supreme Court has under consideration Bush v. Gore, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 512, 148 L.Ed.2d 553 (2000), and I do not concur in the reissued opinion.
Letter from Katherine Harris to Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (Nov. 15, 2000).
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 69 U.S.L.W. 4020, 4021 (2000) (citation omitted).