Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the circumstances presented by this case did not warrant invocation of paragraph 17 (d) of the subject proprietary lease. Moreover, even if paragraph 17 (d) were applicable, it would not avail plaintiffs since, as mere contract vendees of shares allocated to an apartment in defendant Columbia 160 Apartments, they remained strangers to the cooperative corporation's proprietary lease and consequently were without standing to invoke the rights of the seller thereunder (see, Sims v Darwood Mgt., 147 A.D.2d 373, 376-377). Given the inapplicability of paragraph 17 (d), the motion court properly determined that cooperative board approval was required as a condition precedent to defendant Independence's sale of the subject shares in the cooperative corporation to plaintiffs, and that the failure to obtain such approval precluded plaintiffs from bringing an action for specific performance against the bank (see, Morse v Ted Cadillac, 146 A.D.2d 756, 757, appeal dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 700). Since there was no breach by Independence of its contract of sale with plaintiffs, the cause of action alleging that such a breach had occurred and that it had been tortiously induced by defendant Columbia 160, was properly dismissed (supra). Finally, plaintiffs submitted no evidence of self-dealing warranting judicial interference with the cooperative board's determination to deny plaintiffs' application to purchase shares in the cooperative corporation (see, Simpson v Berkley Owner's Corp., 213 A.D.2d 207).