McCRAVEN v. CITY OF CHICAGO No. 97 C 8845.
18 F.Supp.2d 877 (1998)
Xadrian McCRAVEN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal corporation, the City of Chicago Department of Police, Glenn E. Carr, John F. Harris, Thomas Sadler, Valerie C. Rodgers, and Raymond Johnson, Defendants.
United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
August 19, 1998.
Steven A. Adatto, Kusper & Raucci, Chartered, Chicago, IL, for Xadrian McCraven.
Mary Leone Smith, Brian L. Crowe, Tracey Renee Ladner, City of Chicago, Law Dept. Corp. Counsel, Chicago, IL, Derrick Matthew Kedziora, City of Chicago Corp. Counsel's Office, Chicago, IL, for Thomas Sadler, Valerie C. Rodgers and Raymond Johnson.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
BUCKLO, District Judge.
Xadrian McCraven filed a six count complaint against the defendants arising from the denial of his application to become a police officer with the Chicago Police Department ("CPD"). He alleges race discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985(3), and state law claims for wrongful use of expunged arrest records, 775 ILCS 5/2-103, and for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. The defendants move to dismiss all counts of Mr. McCraven's complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
According to the complaint, the CPD's hiring process consists of several steps and the disqualification from any one step results in the removal of a candidate from further consideration for employment. The first stage is a written exam. If an applicant passes, the CPD administers psychological assessments, performs drug screenings, and conducts a background investigation. Mr. McCraven alleges that all the individual defendants were responsible for establishing or implementing the recruitment, examination, and hiring procedures for the CPD.
Mr. McCraven states that he is African American, has a college degree, and possesses all the necessary prerequisites to become a police officer. He claims that he initially applied for a job as a police officer prior to 1991 and was specifically informed that his arrest record was the reason he was ineligible for the position. In June 1991, he states he submitted another application to the CPD (the "1991 application"). During that process, he was allegedly notified that he failed the psychological examination and his candidacy was terminated. In 1992, he says he was notified that he could retake the psychological examination as part of a settlement regarding bias within the examination and that he took the examination again and passed in early 1993. Also in 1992, Mr. McCraven alleges that he filed a motion to expunge his arrest records and that an order expunging the records was entered on December 30, 1992.
In October 1993, Mr. McCraven says he again applied to become a police officer with the CPD (the "1993 application") and took the written examination later that year. The CPD then allegedly assigned Detective Johnson to conduct the background investigation on his 1991 application. To prepare the background investigation report, Detective Johnson allegedly obtained a copy of Mr. McCraven's "rap sheet" with the expungement order attached. Mr. McCraven claims that Detective Johnson contacted different units within the CPD and questioned specific officers regarding his expunged arrests and reviewed individual case reports from the units regarding those arrests. In the background investigation report dated September 15, 1994, Mr. McCraven states that Detective Johnson included information on his expunged arrests. In October, 1994, Detective Johnson allegedly told Mr. McCraven that he would not recommend Mr. McCraven for a position because of his arrest record. Mr. McCraven contends that he told Detective Johnson that his arrests were expunged and that he continued with the application process despite Detective Johnson's statements. Nevertheless, Detective Johnson allegedly continued to investigate the expunged arrests and added two addendums to the investigation report on November 1 and 28, 1994, which included additional information on those arrests.
Mr. McCraven states that on April 30, 1995, the CPD formally assigned Detective Rodgers to conduct the background investigation on Mr. McCraven's 1993 application. Detective Rodgers allegedly considered Mr. McCraven's expunged arrest record and other arrest information and prepared a preliminary background report dated May 23, 1995. Soon thereafter, Mr. McCraven claims that
Mr. Sadler, Mr. Harris, and Mr. Carr allegedly encouraged and ratified the detectives' use of expunged arrest records and other arrest information during the background investigation. On December 19, 1995, Mr. McCraven states that Mr. Harris recommended to Mr. Carr that Mr. McCraven be removed from the eligibility list due to the background investigation. On March 18, 1996, Mr. McCraven says that Mr. Carr informed him that he was disqualified for a police position.
Mr. McCraven filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC issued a right to sue letter on September 30, 1997. Mr. McCraven filed this action on December 22, 1997.
Motion to Dismiss
As an initial matter, the CPD is not a proper defendant to this action. As a subdivision of the City of Chicago (the "City"), the CPD has no separate independent legal existence apart from the City. Chan v. City of Chicago,
A. Title VII and Section 1981
Mr. McCraven claims that the CPD discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII and § 1981 when it refused to hire him as a police officer because of his expunged arrest records and related information. The City contends that Mr. McCraven has failed to state claims for disparate treatment on the basis of race under both Title VII and § 1981. See Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc.,
Mr. McCraven, however, is not required to allege in his complaint that the City treated similarly situated whites more favorably in a failure to hire case. Rather, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he applied and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) that despite his qualifications, he was not hired, and (4) that after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons with his qualifications. Ost v. West Suburban Travelers Limousine, Inc.,
B. Illinois Human Rights Act
Mr. McCraven alleges that the CPD violated the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA") when it used his expunged arrest records in determining whether he was qualified as a police officer. The IHRA provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to inquire into or to use the fact of an arrest or criminal history record information ordered expunged, sealed or impounded ... as a basis to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with respect to recruitment, hiring,...." 775 ILCS 5/2-103. Under Illinois law, the Illinois Human Rights Commission ("IHRC") has exclusive authority over claims arising under the IHRA. Talley v. Washington Inventory Serv.,
Mr. McCraven argues that this court should assume jurisdiction over the IHRA claim since it is based on his constitutionally protected right to privacy. Mr. McCraven cannot add a claim for deprivation of his constitutional right to privacy in a response to a motion to dismiss. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
C. Section 1983
Count III alleges a § 1983 claim against the individual defendants in their individual and official capacities.
To bring a § 1983 claim, Mr. McCraven must establish that: (1) he held a constitutionally protected right; (2) he was deprived of this right in violation of the Constitution; (3) the defendants intentionally caused this deprivation; and (4) the defendants acted under color of state law. McNabola v. Chicago Transit Auth.,
The defendants respond that Mr. McCraven cannot establish an equal protection claim because he failed to allege that African Americans were singled out for differential treatment because of their race. They contend that the CPD evaluated the arrest records of all persons, not just African American persons. Although "[g]eneral rules that apply evenhandedly to all persons" comply with the equal protection clause, "when a governmental unit adopts a rule that has a special impact on less than all the persons subject to its jurisdiction," it may have violated the equal protection clause. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
In the alternative, the defendants contend that Mr. McCraven's § 1983 claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations: Illinois' two-year statute of limitations for a personal injury tort action. Kalimara v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections,
Mr. McCraven filed his complaint on December 22, 1997. The defendants contend that the limitations period has run because all allegations pertaining to Detective Johnson, Detective Rodgers, and Mr. Harris relate to conduct that occurred prior to December 22, 1995. The defendants also argue that the limitations period has run with respect to claims against Mr. Carr because Mr. McCraven could have discovered his claim prior to December 22, 1995 through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Mr. McCraven responds that his claim is not barred because the defendants' conduct constitutes a continuing violation. "[W]here the employer's decision-making process [relating to hiring] takes place over a period of time, making it difficult to determine the actual date of the allegedly discriminatory act[,] ... the statute of limitations begins running for the claim when the plaintiff knows that the decision has been made." Jones v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
D. Section 1985(3)
Count V alleges that the defendants conspired to impede and hinder Mr. McCraven's rights as guaranteed under the Constitution. To state a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the law, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL-CIO v. Scott,
The defendants contend that Mr. McCraven has not sufficiently alleged a conspiracy because he has failed to allege any facts which support the existence of an agreement or mutual understanding among the defendants. Count V makes the conclusory allegation that the defendants conspired to deprive Mr. McCraven of his constitutional rights and then incorporates the preceding
The defendants also contend that even if Mr. McCraven has sufficiently alleged a conspiracy under § 1985(3), the intracorporate immunity doctrine precludes the imposition of liability. This doctrine precludes liability against "managers of a corporation jointly pursuing its lawful business ... when acts within the scope of their employment are said to be discriminatory or retaliatory." Travis v. Gary Community Mental Health Ctr., Inc.,
There are two exceptions to the doctrine: (1) where the employees were motivated solely by personal bias, or (2) there were numerous acts undertaken by several corporate employees such that the discrimination permeated the ranks of the organization's employees. Hartman v. Board of Trustees,
E. Fraud, Misrepresentation, and Deceit
Mr. McCraven alleges that prior to 1991 he applied for a police officer position with the CPD and was rejected. He claims that the CPD, through its agents, informed him that his arrest record was the specific reason for his rejection. Relying on that information, Mr. McCraven had his arrest record expunged and then reapplied for the position. Despite his actions, the CPD again denied his application on March 18, 1996. Mr. McCraven claims that the CPD, through its agents and written materials, made material misrepresentations of fact by stating that he was denied a position because of his arrest record by stating that he would be judged on the basis of merit and ability, and that he would be fairly evaluated for employment. He further claims that the CPD, through its agents, concealed facts from him which it had an affirmative duty to disclose, specifically that the CPD would not provide Mr. McCraven with the opportunity to be evaluated on a nondiscriminatory basis for hiring and that his expunged arrest record would still result in the denial of his application.
Even assuming that Mr. McCraven sufficiently alleges a claim for fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, his claim is barred by the statute of limitations. The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/8-101, provides a one year statute of limitations for all civil actions against a municipality and its employees. Mr. McCraven was informed by Detective Johnson in October, 1994 and December, 1995 that he would not be hired because of his arrest record. On March 18, 1996, Mr. Carr told Mr. McCraven that he was officially disqualified for a police officer position. On that date, Mr. McCraven knew of his injury and should have filed suit within one
Mr. McCraven responds that his claim is timely because he has alleged a continuing violation and under that theory the statute of limitations only begins to run from the date of the last injury or tortious act. See Wolf v. City of Chicago Heights,
The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint is granted in part and denied in part. Counts II and VI are dismissed. Detective Rodgers is dismissed from Count V. The remaining counts may proceed as set forth above.
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