DOE v. OHIO STATE UNIV. HOSP. & CLINICS No. 94API11-1625.
105 Ohio App.3d 406 (1995)
DOE, Appellant, v. OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS AND CLINICS, Appellees.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.
Decided September 19, 1995.
Luper, Wolinetz, Sheriff & Neidenthal and Eugene R. Butler, for appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Marilena R. Walters and Catherine Cola, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
This matter is before this court upon the appeal of plaintiff, "John Doe," from the October 19, 1994 judgment entry of the Court of Claims of Ohio, which entered judgment in favor of defendant, the Ohio State University ("OSU") Hospitals and Clinics.
The facts of this case are as follows: In 1988, plaintiff discovered that he was HIV positive; however, he chose to keep his HIV status confidential and told only those he felt had a "right to know." On March 3, 1991, he experienced severe abdominal pain and vomiting. He sought treatment at OSU's emergency room, where he was informed that he had a kidney stone. When asked if he had a physician who had previously treated him for kidney stones, plaintiff responded that, in the past, he had been treated for this condition by Dr. Henry Wise. Plaintiff was advised that Dr. Wise would be in the OSU Outpatient Clinic the next day, and was instructed to call Dr. Wise to make an appointment. On March 4, 1991, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Wise, who ordered that plaintiff undergo lithotripsy surgery. Dr. Wise also ordered two laboratory tests which are standing orders for a lithotripsy: a complete blood count ("CBC"), and a potassium test. Jane Benner, Dr. Wise's nurse, was working in the clinic that day and completed the requisition form requesting these tests.
In any event, plaintiff was tested for the HIV virus; the positive results were reported to the Ohio Department of Health. Upon learning that he had been tested without his consent, plaintiff confronted Dr. Wise, who immediately denied ordering such a test; in fact, Dr. Wise denied any knowledge that the test had been performed. Plaintiff also contacted Judy McDermott, the head of Personnel Health, and Pinky Davis, another OSU employee, who both indicated that they would investigate the matter. When no information was forthcoming, plaintiff initiated this lawsuit, alleging violations of R.C. 3701.241 et seq.
The trial court found that the complaint sounded in negligence and that a reasonable person would interpret the requisition as a physician's order to perform an HIV test. Noting OSU's policy of requiring the physician to obtain informed consent (Joint Exhibit D), the court found that a reasonable person would have concluded that the physician had obtained the appropriate informed consent before ordering an HIV test. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendant. Plaintiff now appeals, asserting the following assignments of error:
"I. The trial court's interpretation of R.C. 370.244(B) [sic] was contrary to law.
"II. The judgment of the court of claims is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
"III. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the legislative intent testimony of a witness who drafted R.C. 3701.242."
By his first assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court's interpretation of R.C. 3701.244(B) was contrary to law, insofar as it introduced a negligence standard in finding that a reasonable person could have concluded that Dr. Wise obtained the informed consent required by R.C. 3701.242. We agree. Plaintiff's action is not premised on negligence; rather, plaintiff brought an action premised upon the statutory cause of action set forth in R.C. 3701.244(B). R.C. 3701.242(A) provides:
Clearly, R.C. 3701.242(A) was violated. R.C. 3701.242(A) provides that an HIV test shall be performed only if informed consent is obtained prior to the test. It is undisputed that informed consent was never obtained by Dr. Wise, Nurse Benner, or the person/agency performing the test. Thus, the HIV test should not have been performed. R.C. 3701.244(B) provides that:
"A person or an agency of state or local government that knowingly violates division (A) of section 3701.242 * * * of the Revised Code may be found liable in a civil action; the action may be brought by any individual injured by the violation. Except as otherwise provided in division (C) or (D) of this section, the court may award compensatory damages and any equitable relief, including injunctive relief it finds appropriate. If an award is made in favor of the plaintiff, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff after a hearing to determine the amount of the fees." (Emphasis added.)
In a negligence cause of action, one must demonstrate a duty, a breach of that duty and an injury resulting proximately therefrom. Jeffers v. Olexo (1989),
However, this court is not convinced that such error was so prejudicial as to warrant reversal. Pursuant to R.C. 3701.244(B), plaintiff must also demonstrate a "knowing" violation of R.C. 3701.242(A). Plaintiff cites to this court several cases for his proposition that to "knowingly" violate the statute simply means that one knows of the existence of R.C. 3701.242(A) and acts contrary to it. Thus, plaintiff argues that because defendant's employees knew of the statute requiring informed consent, and did not obtain such informed consent, the "knowingly" requirement of R.C. 3701.244(B) has been satisfied.
In Tonti v. Supt, of Banks (Aug. 3, 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1361, unreported, 1993 WL 303622, this court used a slightly different definition of "knowingly." In Tonti, a civil penalty was assessed against the appellant for knowingly violating R.C. 1125.18. The court required either actual awareness that one was violating the statute, or that facts be established from which such awareness could be inferred. Specifically, this court found that there were several reasonable inferences to support the trial court's finding that the knowledge element of R.C. 1125.18 was satisfied. Id.
The fourth case cited by plaintiff, Bierlein v. Alex's Continental Inn, Inc. (1984),
At first blush, it would appear that the Einhorn court's definition of "knowingly" could be applied in the instant case to support plaintiff's position. However, we find Einhorn distinguishable from the case at bar. As previously noted, the narrow question presented in Einhorn was whether a consumer is entitled, under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, to an award of attorney fees if the supplier
Moreover, the Einhorn court recognized that the term "knowingly," as used in the Consumer Sales Practices Act, modified the phrase "committed an act or practice" but did not modify the phrase "violates this chapter." In contrast, the term "knowingly," as used in R.C. 3701.244(B), modifies the phrase "violates division (A) of section 3701.242 * * * of the Revised Code."
Thus, in applying the reasoning of the above cases, this court finds that plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant had actual awareness that R.C. 3701.242(A) had been violated, or, at the very least, plaintiff must establish facts from which knowledge could be inferred. Tonti, supra. A review of the record leads us to a contrary conclusion. Defendant had a policy in place by which the physician was required to obtain the necessary informed consent pursuant to R.C. 3701.242(A). Thus, in the instant case, the trial court could find that defendant did not have any actual knowledge that informed consent was not obtained. Nor were any facts presented which would imply that defendant had that knowledge. Clearly defendant only performs tests that are ordered by a doctor.
Defendant relied on this notation and performed the HIV tests. While defendant violated R.C. 3701.242(A) by performing the test, there is no evidence that defendant did this knowingly. The fact that defendant "knew" of the existence of R.C. 3701.242(A), and that informed consent must be obtained, is not sufficient to demonstrate a knowing violation, for purposes of R.C. 3701.244(B). Because plaintiff demonstrated a violation of R.C. 3701.242(A), but failed to
By his second assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the judgment of the Court of Claims is against the manifest weight of the evidence. As noted in our earlier discussion, plaintiff clearly demonstrated that R.C. 3701.242(A) was violated. However, such a violation does not automatically lead to liability pursuant to R.C. 3701.244(B). Again, there must be a "knowing" violation, and knowledge of the statutory requirement alone is not sufficient to establish a "knowing" violation. Tonti, Gressman, and Carson, supra. Moreover, even if a "knowing" violation is demonstrated, R.C. 3701.244(B) does not impose automatic liability. See fn 3.
In this assignment of error, plaintiff also argues that Wise was the agent for defendant and, therefore, his failure to obtain consent is imputed to the hospital. Both parties cite Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Health Ctr. (1994),
"A hospital may be held liable under the doctrine of agency by estoppel for the negligence of independent medical practitioners practicing in the hospital when: (1) it holds itself out to the public as a provider of medical services; and (2) in the absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary, the patient looks to the hospital, as opposed to the individual practitioner, to provide competent medical care. (Albain v. Flower Hosp. ,
The Clark court relied on the analysis in Grewe v. Mt. Clemens Gen. Hosp. (1978),
"`[T]he critical question is whether the plaintiff, at the time of his admission to the hospital, was looking to the hospital for treatment of his physical ailments or merely viewed the hospital as the situs where his physician would treat him for his problems. A relevant factor in this determination involves resolution of the question of whether the hospital provided the plaintiff with [the treating physician] or whether the plaintiff and [the treating physician] had a patient-physician relationship independent of the hospital setting.'"
In the instant action, there is evidence to support plaintiff's position that he looked to the hospital for treatment of his physical ailment, insofar as he was an employee of OSU and, in order to reap the most insurance benefits, he looked to
More compelling, however, is the policy that defendant had in place regarding the procedures for ordering and performing HIV tests. Clearly, this policy required the physician to obtain the necessary informed consent for purposes of R.C. 3701.242(A). Thus, defendant placed this duty on the physician, and the physician's was acting as defendant's agent for that purpose.
However, even though we have determined that Wise was acting as defendant's agent, the fact remains that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Wise "knowingly" violated R.C. 3701.242(A). If plaintiff wishes to hold defendant, as principal, responsible for the "wrongful" acts of its agent, Wise, then Wise must have violated the statute in some way. Assuming, arguendo, that Wise was the agent of defendant for purposes of obtaining informed consent, Wise never obtained informed consent, because Wise never ordered an HIV test. Thus, Wise could not have "knowingly" violated R.C. 3701.242(A) by his failure to obtain consent. Moreover, as pointed out by plaintiff, R.C. 3701.242(A) states that no test shall be performed unless informed consent is obtained. Thus, theoretically, Wise could have ordered a test, and failed to obtain informed consent, but until an HIV test was actually performed, there would be no violation of R.C. 3701.242(A).
For all of the above reasons, as well as the reasons previously articulated in the first assignment of error, plaintiff's second assignment of error is not well taken.
By his third assignment of error, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the legislative intent testimony of Elliot Fishman, an attorney who assisted in drafting the bill which ultimately became R.C. 3701.241 et seq. Plaintiff proffered this testimony in an effort to demonstrate that R.C. 3701.242(A) requires that both the person/agency ordering the test and the person/agency performing the test, obtain the required informed consent. Initially, this court notes that the admission and/or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Columbus v. Taylor (1988),
"An HIV test shall be performed only if prior to the test, informed consent is obtained either by the person * * * ordering the test or by the person or agency performing the test. Consent may be given orally or in writing after the person or agency performing or ordering the test has given the individual to be tested * * * the following information[.]" (Emphasis added.)
We do not agree with plaintiff's assertion that the statutory language above is ambiguous. The statute clearly provides that either the person/agency ordering the test or the person/agency performing the test must obtain the necessary consent. R.C. 1.42 provides that words and phrases shall be used in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and plain language. As noted by defendant, the word "or" connotes an alternative. The words "either, or" connote a choice between two alternatives. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the statute is to be applied, not interpreted. See Columbus & Franklin Cty. Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank (1992),
Plaintiff further argues that the trial court's construction of the statute leads to absurd results, insofar as "no liability would result to anyone since plaintiff's physician did not order the test and could not be liable and since Ohio State has a policy which requires only the physician ordering the test to obtain the consent. In this circumstance, no liability would be imposed under this construction of the statute since it is only the physician who has the responsibility to obtain the consent." This court disagrees. R.C. 3701.244(B) provides that anyone who knowingly violates R.C. 3701.242(A) may be held liable in a civil action. Thus, if defendant performs an HIV test with knowledge that informed consent has not been obtained by the physician, defendant could then be found liable for a knowing violation of R.C. 3701.242(A).
Because we find that the statute, as written, is unambiguous, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony of Fishman. For all of the above reasons, plaintiff's third assignment of error is not well taken.
JOHN C. YOUNG and CLOSE, JJ., concur.
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