PENICK v. STATENo. 17S00-9404-CR-389.
659 N.E.2d 484 (1995)
Jimmie Lee PENICK, Appellant (Defendant Below),
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
Supreme Court of Indiana.
December 19, 1995.
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, J. Michael Sauer, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Pamela Carter, Attorney General, Christopher L. Lafuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for appellee.
ON DIRECT APPEAL
Jimmie Lee Penick pled guilty to one count of murder, and was sentenced to sixty (60) years, the maximum allowed under his plea agreement, to be served consecutively to a prior Ohio sentence. He now appeals from this sentence.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court, in determining the sentence, considered improper aggravating factors and failed to consider mitigating factors which were supported by the record.
Penick, Mark Goodwin, Keith Lawrence, and David Lawrence were all workers for amusement companies, and were working at the DeKalb County Free Fall Fair. All were involved in Satanic practices. William Anthony Ault, also a co-worker, wanted to join the Satanic Church. Since Ault knew about a previous murder committed by Penick, defendant and the others wanted to scare him in order to keep him from talking about it.
On September 25, 1991, Brenda Ferguson, a friend, was asked to help Goodwin find a secluded place where they could initiate Ault into the Satanic Church. After the carnival closed for the evening, Ferguson drove the five men to a secluded farm building, and dropped them off. Ault was asked to lie down on a door, which was being used as an altar. He was then tied up and gagged. Keith Lawrence read an invocation to Satan. Using Keith Lawrence's knife, Penick made a deep cut on Ault from the neck to the stomach. Goodwin and the Lawrences also made cuts on Ault's chest and abdomen in the form of an inverted cross, as well as other cuts. Penick then asked Ault if he were ready to die, and when Ault answered, Penick slit his throat. Penick, Goodwin and Keith Lawrence cut off Ault's head and hands, and attempted to burn them. After disposing of the remains, the members of the group and Ferguson used money stolen from Ault to purchase food at Arby's.
Keith Lawrence pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, and received a fifty year sentence, with 20 years suspended. His brother, David Lawrence, pled guilty to assisting a criminal, and received eight years. Mark Goodwin pled to assisting a criminal and battery committed by means of a deadly weapon. He received eight years for each charge, to be served concurrently. [R. 1331-32].
On November 23, 1993, Defendant pled guilty to murder. In exchange, the state withdrew its request for the death penalty. Both sides agreed that the trial court would sentence defendant, with the State and defendant free to argue the sentence. Defendant was sentenced to sixty years, and now appeals from that sentence.
I. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors.
In this case, the trial judge found ten aggravating factors, and one mitigating factor. The aggravating factors are:
(2) Defendant Jimmie Lee Penick is in need of correctional or rehabilitative
(10) This was the second time that Defendant Jimmie Lee Penick has murdered someone because previously in August of 1991 he murdered a man in Fulton County, Ohio also cutting his throat with a knife.
[R. 1223-24, 1414-18]. Aggravating factors (1), (2), and (3) are express statutory factors under § 35-38-1-7.1(b). The other aggravators are permitted under subsection (d), which allows the trial judge to consider factors other than those which are expressly listed.
The one mitigating circumstance found by the trial judge is that the Defendant Jimmie Lee Penick was cooperative and appeared to be open and truthful in the pre-sentence investigation process. [R. 1224].
A. Aggravating Factors
Only one aggravator is necessary in order for the trial court to impose an enhanced sentence. Reaves v. State (1992), Ind.,
Defendant first argues that the court considered several aggravating factors which are not supported by the record. The first of these is that Penick is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided by commitment to a penal facility. Penick argues that the trial court must state why a defendant would be best served by commitment to a penal facility, and he claims that the trial court did not do that. However, the trial court explained that prior multiple probations and multiple incarcerations have not caused the defendant to cease criminal activity and be rehabilitated. [R. 1223-24]. This is more than a mere perfunctory recitation, and is sufficient to support this aggravating factor. See Shackelford v. State (1993), Ind.App.,
Penick next argues that aggravator (5), the death was painful and torturous, is
Defendant also argues that aggravator (3), "imposition of a reduced or suspended sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime," is applicable only when the court is considering the imposition of a reduced sentence, not when considering whether the defendant should receive less than the maximum enhanced sentence. See I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(4). Defendant is correct that this statutory factor focuses on imposition of a reduced sentence and it may be used only when considering the imposition of a sentence which is shorter than the presumptive sentence. E.g., Walton v. State (1995), Ind.,
Finally, defendant argues that aggravators (6) dismemberment of victim's head and hands, and (7) concealing victim's body, are one in the same. Even if defendant is correct, this would not be sufficient error to require modification of the sentence. The balancing performed by the trial judge is qualitative, not quantitative. "It is for the trial judge to determine the sentencing weight to be given the aggravating or mitigating factors." Gilley v. State (1989), Ind.,
Defendant also argues that the trial court relied on impermissible factors, including the harm to the community and impact on the victim's friends and family. However, the trial court was careful to exclude these items from his list of aggravators. Further, even if the trial judge had considered impermissible factors, if there are sufficient proper aggravating circumstances to support an enhanced sentence this court should affirm the sentence. Scheckel v. State (1993), Ind.,
We hold that the trial court did find sufficient proper aggravating circumstances to support the enhanced sentence in this case.
B. Mitigating Factors.
Defendant next argues that the trial court failed to consider mitigators which were clearly supported by the record. Although a court must consider the evidence of mitigating factors presented by a defendant, the finding of mitigating circumstances lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Aguirre v. State (1990), Ind.,
Defendant next argues that he acted under the influence of his strong beliefs in Satanism. Defendant also argues that he has made significant positive changes while incarcerated. The trial court noted defendant's involvement in Satanism, as well as his minister's testimony about his conversion to Christianity, but chose to give neither the influence of strong beliefs nor this jail house conversion any mitigating weight. We do not find abuse of discretion for failure to find mitigating factors in this evidence.
Finally, defendant claims his sincere remorse should be a mitigating factor. However, a finding of remorse is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Enamorado v. State (1989), Ind.,
II. Reasonableness of Sentence
The defendant argues that a sentence of sixty years is manifestly unreasonable when compared to the sentences given to the others who were involved in this murder. However, the trial court found Penick to be the person most responsible for Ault's death. [R. 1412]. Because Penick's involvement was greater than the other participants, it is not manifestly unreasonable for him to receive a greater sentence. See Spranger v. State (1986), Ind.,
Lastly, defendant complains that his sentence is to be served consecutive to an Ohio sentence, and this is manifestly unfair. Defendant could have gone further and argued that the trial judge was without power to order the sentences to be served consecutively, since he was not imposing both sentences at the same time.
The sentence of sixty years imposed by the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DeBRULER, DICKSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.
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