QUALITY AUTO PARTS v. BLUFF CITY BUICK
876 S.W.2d 818 (1994)
QUALITY AUTO PARTS CO., INC., Plaintiff (non-appealing party), v. BLUFF CITY BUICK CO., INC., Milton Schaeffer, and Joseph Schaeffer, Counter-Defendants/Appellants, v. Whitson KIMBROW, Counter-Plaintiff/Appellee.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.
Rehearing Denied May 16, 1994.
Joseph Michael Cook, Memphis (Jim Waide, of counsel), Tupelo, MS, for appellee.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the discovery rule applies to the six-month statute of limitations for slander, and whether the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act is applicable. We also consider whether a claim has been stated for the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the discovery rule does not apply to the slander statute of limitations because of the nature of slander and the explicit language of the statute. We also agree that the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act is not applicable and that a claim has not been stated for the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. Accordingly, we do not address the question of whether the tort should be recognized in this case.
This action began when Quality Auto Parts Co., Inc. ("Quality"), filed suit against Bluff City Buick Company, Inc. ("Bluff City") to collect an unpaid account for auto parts. Bluff City responded by filing a third party action against their own employee, Whitson Kimbrow, Jr., and Quality's president, James M. Williams. The action alleged that Williams created "phony" parts invoices from Quality, that were paid by Kimbrow, as parts manager for Bluff City, with Williams and Kimbrow splitting the profits from the conspiracy.
Kimbrow denied the charges and filed a counterclaim for slander, alleging that representatives of Bluff City made defamatory statements about him, including calling him a "thief" and saying that he was "stealing from the company." Kimbrow learned of one statement three and one-half months after it was made, another approximately five months after it was made, and the rest within ten months. All agree the slander action was filed more than six months after "the words were uttered."
Kimbrow's counter-claim also maintained that the statements were a "disparaging of his services or business" and, therefore, violated
Bluff City filed a motion to dismiss Kimbrow's counter-claim, and the trial court dismissed the counter-claim with prejudice. The trial court concluded that the slander action was time-barred by the expiration of the six-month statute of limitations;
Kimbrow appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision dismissing the consumer protection claim and the tort of intentional interference with prospective business relations, but held the slander claim was not time-barred. The Court of Appeals concluded that the six-month statute of limitations did not begin to run until Kimbrow discovered the injury.
Because the trial court has held Kimbrow's complaint legally insufficient by its failure to state a claim, we will take as true all well-pleaded, material factual allegations, and we will construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff in our discussion of the issues which follows. Dobbs v. Guenther,
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
We first consider whether the discovery rule applies to the six month statute of limitations for slander. Essential to our analysis is an examination of the origin and purpose of the discovery rule in Tennessee, as well as the history and development of the law of defamation, specifically slander.
The discovery rule was first announced in Teeters v. Currey,
In contrast to the rationale for the discovery rule are the policy reasons for the development of statutes of limitations to ensure fairness to the defendant by preventing undue delay in bringing suits on claims, and by preserving evidence so that facts are not obscured by the lapse of time or the defective memory or death of a witness. Potts v. Celotex Corp.,
Also necessary to our decision is an understanding of the development of the law of defamation, which includes both slander and libel. A libel action involves written defamation and a slander action involves spoken defamation. The basis for an action for defamation, whether it be slander or libel, is that the defamation has resulted in an injury to the person's character and reputation. Little Stores v. Isenberg, 26 Tenn. App. 357, 172 S.W.2d 13, 16 (1943). Historically, however, a distinction has been drawn between the two types of defamation.
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 112 at 785 (West 5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) (hereinafter referred to as "Prosser, § ____ at ___"). In Tennessee, the distinction establishing libel as the greater wrong was said to be "founded in the deliberate malignity displayed by reducing the offensive matter to writing." Williams v. Karnes, 23 Tenn. 9, 11 (1843).
The historical distinction discussed above is evident in Tennessee's current statutes of limitations on slander and libel. Actions for slander must "be commenced within six (6) months after the words are uttered," Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-103 (1980); while, in contrast, a plaintiff bringing an action for libel has one year from the time "the cause of action accrued." Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 (1980 and Supp. 1993). The difference in the time limitations implicitly recognizes the degree of wrong between the two torts.
Other jurisdictions generally hold that a cause of action for defamation, whether libel or slander, accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of publication of the defamatory material. Publication is a term of art meaning the communication of defamatory matter to a third person. In the case of slander, "publication" occurs when the defamatory matter is spoken. Little Stores, 172 S.W.2d at 16; see also Applewhite v. Memphis State University,
The great majority of courts in other jurisdictions have held that the discovery rule does not alter the general rule that the time period begins to run when the words are uttered.
We conclude that the rationale for declining to apply the discovery rule to defamation statutes of limitations is persuasive.
Based on the foregoing reasoning, we conclude that the discovery rule does not apply to Tennessee's slander statute of limitations; and accordingly, Kimbrow's claim for slander is time barred.
CONSUMER PROTECTION CLAIM
Next, Kimbrow contends that the statements made by the agents and employees of Bluff City violate the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, despite the fact that the statements arose in the employer-employee context. Kimbrow says that the false statements alleged in his complaint disparaged his services to such an extent that he has since been unable to get a job as a parts manager. In support of his claim, Kimbrow relies on Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104 (1988 & Supp. 1993), which provides in pertinent part:
We note that other state courts have concluded, as did the trial court and the Court of Appeals, that consumer protection laws do not apply to disputes arising in the context of employer-employee relationships. Manning v. Zuckerman,
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
Lastly, we consider Kimbrow's contention that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that Tennessee does not recognize the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.
Tennessee undoubtedly does recognize both a statutory and common law action for unlawful inducement of a breach of contract. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-50-109 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Polk & Sullivan, Inc. v. United Cities Gas Co.,
Most jurisdictions and commentators agree the tort is composed of the following elements: (1) the existence of a business relationship or expectancy (an existing contract is not required); (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy; (3) an intentional act of interference; (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained; and (5) damage to the plaintiff. Id., 5 A.L.R.4th at § 2[a], p. 16; see also Crandall Corp. v. Navistar Intern.,
Development of the tort has been parallel to the tort of interference with existing contract. Consequently, most protected "expectancies" have included only fairly specific and certain future contractual relations. Also required has been the ability to ascertain both the lost value and the likelihood that the plaintiff would have received it if the defendant had not interfered. Examples include the prospect of obtaining employment or employees, and the opportunity of obtaining customers. Prosser, § 130, at 1006.
In the current action, Kimbrow acknowledges that Tennessee has never expressly recognized the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, but argues that the tort was implicitly recognized by this Court in the early case of Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134, 135 (1915).
In Hutton, the plaintiff owned a boarding house whose tenants were students at a nearby school. Angered by the plaintiff's refusal to dismiss a boarder with whom Watters, the school president, had quarrelled, Watters threatened to deprive the students boarding with the plaintiff of certain school benefits unless they left her house. Watters also interfered with the plaintiff's access to potential boarders by delivering similar threats to new arrivals at the train station. The trial court dismissed the case, but the Hutton court reversed, holding the allegations stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. No distinction was drawn by the Hutton court between those boarders who had an existing contractual relationship and those prospective boarders who never sought accommodations with the plaintiff due to the defendant's threats. Accordingly, it is not clear that the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage was the claim recognized in Hutton.
It is clear, however, that the resolution of this case does not require that we recognize or reject the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the counter-plaintiff Kimbrow had sought and been refused employment with any specific person or company. Nor is there any claim that Quality knew of any such prospective relationship of employment between Kimbrow and a particular individual or entity. The record contains only Kimbrow's assertion that he has been unable to obtain employment in the Memphis area because of Quality's interference. As Bluff City points out, even if this Court recognized the tort at this time, Kimbrow's claim must fail because his complaint does not allege two essential elements of the tort — (1) the existence of a specific prospective employment relationship and (2) knowledge by Quality of such a relationship. See Meehan v. Amax Oil & Gas, Inc.,
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment dismissing Kimbrow's claims for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The Court of Appeals' judgment applying the discovery rule to the slander statute of limitations is reversed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the counter-plaintiff, Whitson Kimbrow.
REID, C.J., and DROWOTA and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur.
DAUGHTREY, J., not participating.
ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
A petition for rehearing has been filed in this cause by the counter-plaintiff/appellee, Whitson Kimbrow, which the Court has considered and concludes should be denied.
It is so ORDERED.
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