STATE v. SWANSON No. 1 CA-CR 90-1404.
172 Ariz. 579 (1992)
838 P.2d 1340
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ronald SWANSON, Appellant.
Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.
Review Denied November 3, 1992.
Grant Woods, Atty. Gen. by Paul J. McMurdie, Chief Counsel, Crim. Div., and Daniel J. Kiley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.
A. Michael Espino, Navajo County Public Defender by Diana M. Squires, Deputy Public Defender, Holbrook, for appellant.
JACOBSON, Presiding Judge.
Ronald Swanson appeals from his convictions for possession for sale and transportation of cocaine, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(2) and (7), both class 2 felonies. The only issue we need address on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a search of the rental car defendant was driving. We hold that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress evidence obtained in a search and seizure that exceeded the scope of defendant's consent and was otherwise unsupported by probable cause.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning of November 8, 1989, Department of Public Safety Officers Rush and Hash stopped defendant and his passenger as they were driving eastbound on Interstate 40 near Holbrook. The officers were in their patrol car, facing west, when Rush first spotted defendant's car, which Rush believed was speeding in the passing lane. The officers crossed the median of the interstate, accelerated and followed the car.
Defendant was not speeding when the officers reached his car. However, the officers observed him change lanes without signaling. Officer Hash flashed the emergency lights and immediately pulled defendant over. Hash noticed that defendant's vehicle had California plates and observed a cellular phone, a citizen's band (CB) radio, a radar detector, and several pagers in the car.
Officer Hash asked defendant for his driver's license and the vehicle registration. Defendant produced his driver's license and rental car papers. Defendant then accompanied Hash back to the patrol car, where he remained for five to seven minutes, as Hash explained the reason for the stop and issued a warning.
After giving defendant the warning, Officer Hash asked him if he had any guns, large sums of money, or drugs in the car; defendant said no. Hash then asked defendant to read and sign a consent to search form. Officer Rush also handed defendant a copy of a consent form and asked his consent to search the car. Although the officers asked him five or six times, defendant refused to sign the consent form. Defendant did, however, give verbal permission to the officers to "go in and look."
After defendant acquiesced in the search, Hash took out tools and he and
During the search, Officer Rush noticed that the screws on the left rear door panel had been tampered with. He testified that they looked "[l]ike someone had taken a screwdriver to them, loosened them up." He informed Hash. Hash, without asking defendant for additional permission, removed the door panel with a tool known as a "slim jim." There he discovered six kilograms of what appeared to be cocaine. Inside the right rear door the officers found six bottles of vitamin super B.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the state's evidence, arguing that the search of the vehicle was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the court denied the motion and defendant and his passenger were tried. The jury found defendant guilty of possession for sale and transportation of a narcotic drug. See A.R.S. § 13-3408(A)(2) and (7). He was sentenced to concurrent aggravated terms of ten years in prison and fined $150,000. Defendant timely appealed.
Contending that his fourth amendment
1. The search was unconstitutional because it grew out of a pretextual stop;
2. He gave no valid consent to the search; and
3. The search exceeded the scope of consent, if any.
A. Pretext Stop
In reviewing a motion to suppress, this court will consider the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling. State v. Acosta,
Regardless of the officer's underlying motives, a stop is not invalid if there exists a valid, objective reason to make the stop. Id. at 257, 801 P.2d at 492. See also State v. Jeney,
B. Consent to Search
Defendant next argues that he gave no consent to search the vehicle. Alternatively, he argues that if any consent was given, it was invalid because it was procured after the stop had exceeded the time reasonably necessary to effectuate the traffic stop.
The trial court's factual determinations on the issue of giving consent will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. See Acosta, 166 Ariz. at 257, 801 P.2d at 492 ("The validity of consent is determined by considering, in light of all the circumstances, whether the consent was voluntary"). Having reviewed the evidence, including a tape recording that Officer Rush made of his conversation with defendant prior to the search, we conclude that the trial court's determination that defendant voluntarily consented to the search was not clearly erroneous. We do not reach the issue whether the consent was invalid because it was obtained after an unreasonable duration, because the following discussion reveals the search and seizure were unconstitutional for other reasons.
C. Scope of the Search
Although the trial court concluded that defendant consented to the officers' search of the car, it also concluded that the officers' search exceeded the scope of defendant's consent:
This holding is factually supported.
It is well established that "the scope of a consent search is limited by the breadth of the actual consent." United States v. Garcia,
We agree with the trial court that the scope of the officers' search exceeded the breadth of defendant's actual consent in this case. To begin with, a consensual search is limited by the items about which the officer inquired as a predicate to the search. Garcia, supra. Here, similar to Garcia, Officer Hash asked defendant if he had any guns, large sums of money, or drugs in the car. The court in Garcia held that the consent to search the car for similar items did not include searching behind the door panels:
897 F.2d at 1419-20.
Prior to asking for consent, Officer Rush activated a tape recorder hidden in his shirt pocket. The recorded conversation reveals that the officers repeatedly informed defendant that the scope of the search they wished him to consent to would involve "taking a look in the car." In explaining the consent form to defendant, the following exchanges took place:
We agree with the trial court that consent to "take a look in the vehicle" does not encompass the further intrusion of "tearing a car apart" by removing the door panels. See Garcia, supra. See also State v. Murray,
D. Probable Cause
The state concedes that, at the time the officers began the search, they lacked probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of criminal activity. The state supports the initial lawfulness of the search solely on the basis of defendant's consent to search. However, because the search exceeded the scope of defendant's consent to search, we must examine whether the added intrusion was justified. The trial court upheld the search based on the state's evidence that the door panel screws had been tampered with and the officers' knowledge that drugs are often concealed behind door panels.
The trial court erred in using "reasonable basis" as the standard to justify the search. In order for a warrantless search to be lawful, it must be supported by probable cause. State v. Richards,
The trial court's failure to apply the correct standard in denying the motion to suppress is not necessarily fatal; this court will affirm the trial court's ruling even if the trial court reached the correct conclusion on incorrect reasoning. State v. Perez,
Probable cause gives an officer the constitutional authority to search areas of the vehicle outside the scope of the suspect's consent. See United States v. Garcia,
Among the facts justifying a finding of probable cause, the state argues, is the officers' testimony that, although defendant and his passenger appeared calm at the start of the search, they became "nervous" when Officer Rush opened the right rear door. The state contends that a change in a suspect's demeanor can support an inference that there is something incriminating to be found, citing Alicea v. Commonwealth,
Officer Hash testified that defendant was "kind of nervous, or maybe a little bit anxious to move on." He was "[j]ust kind of moving around, and more being in a hurry to leave." Sergeant Lane testified that defendant and his passenger were "very polite, very courteous" while talking with him while Rush and Hash searched the car, although "their heads were turned looking at what the officers were doing," and as the officers searched the middle of the car near the rear doors "the conversation changed a little bit in that it was more fragmatic," and "the types of answers were shorter." In the context of a 45-minute wait, standing beside a busy interstate highway, during which the officers were dismantling the interior of the vehicle, we do not find this behavior unusual.
The state also contends that the officers' knowledge of the "habits of drug carriers," including a common practice of hiding drugs in car door panels, contributed to establish probable cause to search beyond the scope of defendant's consent in this case. See, e.g., State v. Brown,
At the time of defendant's traffic stop, the officers were participating in the Violator Directive Patrol Program, a special detail designed to reduce accidents, apprehend fugitives, and recover stolen vehicles. As part of that program, the officers had been instructed to look for vehicles that had telephones, pagers, CBs, or police scanners, travelling east to west on interstate roads, as potential drug couriers, or "mules." Officer Rush testified that his "suspicion that something was wrong" arose in this case because "[y]ou have these guys going to New York in a rental car to a family reunion, and they have all this electronic gear, that just doesn't add up to me, that's suspicious to me." The coordinator of the Violator Directive Patrol Program testified that contraband is often found in rental vehicles travelling from west to east, and the presence of cellular phones, CB radios, "fuzz busters," or pagers, were also often indicia of contraband in a car.
In our opinion, these indicia of a "drug courier profile" do not give rise to expanding a mere suspicion into probable cause. As defendant correctly points out, this description fits any number of other individuals not engaged in criminal activity, and is an insufficient factual basis for probable cause to overcome the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Houpt,
Finally, the state cites United States v. Garcia,
Garcia, 897 F.2d at 1416. The court upheld this warrantless search behind the
Id. at 1420 (emphasis added).
The difference between the facts in Garcia and in this case are readily apparent. There, the officers did not immediately remove the door panel when their suspicions were aroused by evidence of tampering.
Officers Rush and Hash may have had their suspicions raised by the loose, defaced screws on the door panel. These suspicions might have been enough to warrant further investigation. Cf. Garcia, supra. Whether further investigation might have led to probable cause to search inside the door is merely conjecture. We do not propose here to announce just what steps the officers might have taken to investigate further. We merely hold that, at the point the search extended behind the door panel, probable cause was lacking and the officers conducted an unreasonable search beyond the scope of defendant's consent, in violation of the fourth amendment. The trial court therefore erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during that search.
The conviction is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to grant the defendant's motion to suppress.
CLABORNE and LANKFORD, JJ., concur.
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