DE MUNIZ, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendant on her claim for violation of Oregon's Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA). ORS 646.605 to ORS 646.652. We reverse.
In 1987, plaintiff purchased a used 1986 Mazda from defendant. Defendant knew, but did not tell plaintiff, that the car had been in an accident and had been repaired. It did, however, comply with the Federal Trade Commission's Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule by using a Buyer's Guide form.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in construing ORS 646.612(1) broadly to mean that compliance with any regulations involving the same subject precludes application of UTPA. She argues that the legislative history of UTPA shows that it was intended as broad remedial consumer legislation, see Denson v. Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc., 279 Or. 85, 566 P.2d 1177 (1977), and that the legislature specifically rejected the option to tie UTPA to federal interpretations.
Defendant's position is that the federal government has preempted the field of regulation regarding disclosures in the sale of used motor vehicles and that that preemption is recognized in ORS 646.612(1). It argues that the FTC rule makes it a deceptive practice for any used car dealer to misrepresent the mechanical condition of a used vehicle, 16 CFR § 455.1(a)(1), but, by using the Buyer's Guide form provided in the rule, see 16 CFR § 455(2), a used car dealer avoids that prohibition. Defendant argues that, because it complied with the rule that covers the same conduct that is the "gravamen" of plaintiff's claim, she has no action.
Although both the FTC rule and UTPA are for consumer protection, that coincidence of objectives does not mean that the federal law has preempted Oregon legislation. The authorizing legislation for the FTC's promulgation of the rule does not indicate that Congress intended to control the field exclusively. The Magnuson-Moss Act disavows any intention of Congressional preemption. 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b)(1). Furthermore, enforcement of ORS 646.608(1)(t) does not conflict with the federal rule, which has no requirement of disclosure. The Oregon provision adds an additional, higher requirement, and Oregon was free to make that addition. See Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963); W.J. Seufert v. Nat'l Rest. Sup. Co., 266 Or. 92, 100, 511 P.2d 363 (1973).
Defendant next argues that the history of the FTC rule shows that the FTC specifically decided not to require dealers to disclose known defects, because the commission was concerned that doing so would mislead potential customers into assuming that a used car had no defects. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. F.T.C., 801 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir.1986). Defendant urges that interpreting Oregon law to require disclosure would frustrate the purposes of the FTC rule and, thus, would be in conflict with the rule.
ORS 646.612(1) exempts "[c]onduct in compliance with the orders or rules of * * * [an] agency." Here, the FTC regulation is silent as to disclosure of known defects. Compliance with ORS 646.608(1)(t) does not conflict with the FTC requirements. We conclude that the FTC regulation does not preempt ORS 646.608(1)(t).
Defendant makes three cross-assignments of error to support upholding the summary judgment in its favor, none of which requires discussion. All involve material issues of fact, precluding summary judgment. Seeborg v. General Motors, 284 Or. 695, 588 P.2d 1100 (1978).
Reversed and remanded.