IN RE MARRIAGE OF WEBERG v. WEBERG No. 89-2124.
158 Wis.2d 540 (1990)
463 N.W.2d 382
IN RE the MARRIAGE OF: Karl James WEBERG, Petitioner-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. Mary Ann WEBERG, Respondent-Cross Appellant.
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.
Decided October 4, 1990.
For the petitioner-appellant-cross respondent the cause was submitted on the briefs of Linda S. Balisle and Linda D. Taplick of Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., of Beloit.
For the respondent-cross appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs of
Kenneth W. Forbeck of Forbeck & Monahan, S.C. of Beloit.
Before Eich, C.J., Gartzke, P.J., and Sundby, J.
Karl Weberg appeals from a judgment of divorce. He raises two issues: (1) whether his disability benefits are available for payment of maintenance to his former wife, Mary Ann Weberg; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to limit the maintenance to a specific term of years. Mary Ann Weberg cross-appeals, challenging the court's ruling that a worker's compensation settlement received by Karl
The Webergs were married for twenty-one years. At the time of the divorce, Karl Weberg was forty-four years old and Mary Ann Weberg was forty years old. They have two children, both of whom are adults. Prior to the marriage, Karl Weberg was severely wounded in Vietnam. He was discharged from the army with a physical disability rating of seventy percent. In spite of this disability, he worked for the Chrysler Corporation for ten years during the marriage. After he ended his employment at Chrysler in 1979, his physical status was re-evaluated by the Veterans' Administration as 100 percent permanently disabled. His current income is derived solely from disability payments. He receives Veterans' Administration benefits of $1,469 per month, social security disability benefits of $854 per month, and a disability benefit from Chrysler of $221 per month.
Mary Ann Weberg enjoys good physical and emotional health. She has been employed outside the home since 1980 and presently works forty hours per week at a clinic, earning $5.86 per hour ($234 per week).
The trial court awarded Mary Ann Weberg maintenance of $746 per month for an indefinite period. The maintenance payment, when combined with her employment income, gives her approximately forty-five percent of the parties' total combined income. The marital assets were divided fifty-fifty, each party receiving assets valued at $14,649. Karl Weberg retained as separate property the sum of $10,737, representing the remainder of a lump-sum worker's compensation settlement he had received for injuries incurred during his employment at Chrysler.
Karl Weberg argues first that his federal military disability payments and social security disability payments
Leighton held that a veteran's disability pension is income to be considered in allowing maintenance rather than property to be divided at divorce. Id. at 637, 261 N.W.2d at 465; see also Richardson v. Richardson,
We also reject Weberg's assertion that Leighton is no longer persuasive because of McCarty v. McCarty,
In this case we are not asked to divide Weberg's benefits or award any portion thereof to his wife. We are to decide only whether the payments Weberg is presently receiving may be considered by the court as a factor in assessing his ability to pay spousal maintenance. We thus consider Mansell to be distinguishable on the facts and reject Weberg's claim that it mandates reversal.
Weberg next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding maintenance to Mary Ann Weberg without considering her needs, his ability to pay, and the effects of the property division. He also maintains that the award disregarded the fairness objectives of LaRocque v. LaRocque,
Whether to award maintenance—and the duration and amount thereof if an award is to be made—are matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Bahr v. Bahr,
When fixing maintenance, the starting point is sec. 767.26, Stats., which sets forth several specific factors to be considered by the court and concludes with a "catchall" provision allowing the court to consider any other factors it may deem relevant. Parrett v. Parrett,
The record satisfies us that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. The court gave careful and extensive consideration to each of the statutory factors in light of the facts of the case and reached a reasoned and reasonable result. Although the court did not make a specific finding of Mary Ann Weberg's needs, it considered those needs as reflected in her budget in arriving at its decision. And despite Weberg's contrary assertion, the trial court repeatedly referred to the property agreement in its findings.
We also believe that the fairness objective of LaRocque was met by the court's award. The court did not mechanically apply a fifty-fifty formula to determine maintenance. It considered whether each party was likely to attain a pre-divorce standard of living in the future, taking into account the nature and the sources of their incomes, their future earning potential, and the taxes each must pay. The court then awarded Mary Ann Weberg forty-five percent of their total combined income, stating that the less-than-equal award would give her "an incentive to apply herself . . . [and] utilize the talents that . . . she has." The court also stated that, because of Karl Weberg's disability, "it is fair and equitable to give him a larger share of the total income of the parties." The court's discretionary determination was thus the "product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon [were] stated and . . . considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination." LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d at 27, 406 N.W.2d at 737. There was no abuse of discretion.
Decisions relating to the division of marital property are reviewed for abuse of the trial court's discretion under the standards we have discussed earlier in this opinion. Asbeck v. Asbeck,
Section 767.255, Stats., provides that all property of the parties to a divorce—other than that acquired by one of them through gift, bequest, devise or inheritance—is subject to division. Thus, we have held that "since [a personal injury] settlement was not a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance, it must be a divisible asset." Mack v. Mack,
Karl Weberg suggests, however, that the supreme court in Richardson and Krebs created a presumption that personal injury settlements remain the property of the injured spouse. Richardson did establish such a presumption; but the language of the opinion limited its application to inchoate claims—those which, at the time of the divorce "[have] not resulted in either a judgment or a settlement. . . ." Id., 139 Wis. 2d at 785, 407 N.W.2d at 234. Krebs applied the "logic of Richardson" to payments to be made in the future to one spouse under a structured settlement of a personal injury claim. Krebs at 57, 435 N.W.2d at 243.
In this case, we believe the logic of Richardson and Krebs would make the presumption equally applicable to
Here, Mary Ann Weberg contends that the settlement funds are marital property because they were comingled with marital funds when they were transferred to a joint account and used, in part at least, "for joint and family purposes."
The trial court, rejecting that argument, found that: (1) the funds with which the account was opened were the proceeds of Weberg's worker's compensation settlement; (2) while they were placed in a joint account, these funds "were not co-mingled" with marital assets; and (3) although some monies withdrawn from the account were used for alleged "family" purposes, the account was held jointly only "for the purpose of protecting [Mary Ann Weberg] in the event of [Karl's] death."
Karl Weberg testified that the settlement funds were placed in a joint account with his wife so that she would be the beneficiary of the account in case something happened to him. There also was evidence that occasional withdrawals from the account were used to pay the couple's debts.
There was no evidence that the funds were co-mingled with other marital assets. Nor do we believe that the fact that Weberg may have used some of the interest generated by the account, and some of the principal, to pay marital debts invalidates the court's findings.
In In re Popp,
In Popp, the wife sought access to the stock on grounds that certain assets of the corporation had been used by the husband for marital purposes, and the trial court found in her favor. We overruled, holding that while the corporate assets used for marital purposes and to purchase "marital items" were lost to the husband, the remaining shares had retained their identity as gifted property and could not be considered part of the marital estate. Id. at 788-89, 432 N.W.2d at 603. In reaching that conclusion, we also noted the absence of any "donative intent (actual or constructive) on [the husband's] part" which would support a finding that he "expressly or impliedly indicated that he wished or intended to . . . convert [the shares] to marital property." Id. at 789, 432 N.W.2d at 603.
The trial court's findings that Weberg's settlement funds were not co-mingled so as to change their identity to marital property are not clearly erroneous, and the court's resolution of this issue evidences a rational process based on and consistent with the applicable law as developed in Richardson, Krebs and Popp. Given that, and because the result was one a reasonable court could reach, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the challenged account from the marital estate.
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
SUNDBY, J. (concurring).
This appeal presents an important family law question which is not answered b any Wisconsin decision: Does a Wisconsin court have jurisdiction under sec. 767.26, Stats., to include Veterans'
In Leighton, the wife contended that in dividing the parties' property, the trial court should have considered the present value of the monthly veterans' disability benefits that the husband was receiving. The court rejected her contention explaining, "We . . . view the disability benefits in the case before us as income to the [husband], material only to his ability to pay alimony, if alimony were awarded." Id. at 637, 261 N.W.2d at 465. The court relied on Kronforst v. Kronforst,
Neither Kronforst nor Leighton considered 38 U.S.C. sec. 3101(a) or any of its predecessors. However, this statute was considered in Pfeil v. Pfeil,
However, the Pfeil court was not faced with the question of whether U.S.C. sec. 3101(a) precluded consideration of military service disability benefits in determining child support or alimony (maintenance). In Hisquierdo, the Court held that a statute similar to sec. 3101(a) but applicable to Railroad Retirement Act disability and retirement benefits, precluded a California community property award to the wife in a suit for dissolution of a marriage. In McCarty, the Court held that federal law precluded a state court from dividing military nondisability retired pay pursuant to state community property laws, upon dissolution of a marriage. Thus, none of these cases considered whether military service disability benefits could be used in determining maintenance or child support in a divorce action.
In In re Gardner, 220 Wis. 493, 264 N.W. 643 (1936), the court held that a divorced wife awarded child support was not a "creditor" of the disabled veteran within the federal exemption statute, and hence was entitled to payment of accrued support money from accumulated government payments made to the veteran's guardian. At that time, however, the predecessor to 38 U.S.C. sec. 3101(a) applied to "money due, or to become due," to any pensioner. Section 3101(a) now extends to payments "made to, or on account of, a beneficiary" under any of the laws relating to veterans. In
In Rose, the Court held that a Tennessee statute allowing state courts to require veterans to pay child support out of federal veterans' disability benefits was not preempted by federal law. One of the federal statutes the appellant in Rose relied on was 38 U.S.C. sec. 3101(a). The Court said that the legislative history of this section recognizes two purposes: (1) To avoid the possibility of the Veterans' Administration being placed in the position of a collection agency; and (2) to prevent the deprivation and depletion of the means of subsistence of veterans dependent upon these benefits as the main source of their income. Rose, 481 U.S. at 630.
The Court held that neither purpose was constrained by allowing the state court to hold appellant in contempt for failing to pay child support. The Court said that "the exercise of state-court jurisdiction over appellant's disability benefits [did not] deprive appellant of his means of subsistence contrary to Congress' intent, for these benefits are not provided to support appellant alone." The Court pointed to S. Rep. No. 98-604, at 24 (1984) which states that veterans' disability benefits are intended to "provide reasonable and adequate compensation for disabled veterans and their families." Rose, 481 U.S. at 630 (emphasis supplied by Rose court). The Court further said that, "as evidenced by sec. 3107(a)(2), the provision for apportionment . . . Congress clearly intended veterans' disability benefits to be used, in part, for the support of veterans' dependents." Id. at 631.
It was on this basis that the Court distinguished such cases as Wissner v. Wissner,
Id. (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 587).
The Court noted that the critical difference between Ridgway and the case before it was that Congress had not made appellant the exclusive beneficiary of the disability benefits. Rose, 481 U.S. at 634.
These cases convince me that Mansell v. Mansell
Congress must be presumed to have been aware of the decisions distinguishing between retirement pay and disability pay, insofar as such pay is subject to the anti-attachment statute. The Act authorized state courts to treat "disposable retired or retainer pay" as community property. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. sec. 1408(c)(1)). "Disposable
Unlike the appellant, I find nothing in the Former Spouses' Protection Act or Mansell which provides any indication, clear or otherwise, that Congress did not intend that veterans' disability benefits would be included in assets divided in a divorce. The Act and Mansell are simply silent as to disability pay except that any retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits may be treated by state courts as community property military retirement pay. Presumably, the same result would be reached in an equitable distribution state. See Mansell, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 682 n.2.
I conclude from the foregoing that veterans' disability benefits continue to be benefits available to the veteran and his or her family. Such benefits are therefore subject to a Wisconsin state court's authority to consider veterans' disability benefits in determining child support or maintenance.
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