CAUTHORN v. BRITISH LEYLAND, U.K., LTD. Record No. 840223.
355 S.E.2d 306 (1987)
Richard Mason CAUTHORN, III Legal Guardian, etc. v. BRITISH LEYLAND, U.K., LTD., et al.
Supreme Court of Virginia.
April 24, 1987.
Susan M. Danielski (Christopher C. Fallon, Jr., Philadelphia, Pa., Peter J. Judah, Hot Springs, Cozen, Begier & O'Connor, Philadelphia, Pa., on briefs), for appellants.
William B. Poff (W. Fain Rutherford, Roanoke, William H. Robinson, Jr., H. Slayton Dabney, Jr., Adele Baker, Richmond, William O. Tune, Jr., Linda Davis Frith, Woods, Rogers, Muse, Walker & Thornton, Roanoke, McGuire, Woods & Battle, Richmond, Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, Roanoke, on briefs), for appellees.
Present: CARRICO, C.J., and COCHRAN, POFF, COMPTON, RUSSELL, and THOMAS, JJ., and HARRISON, Retired Justice.
In April 1977, Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, a minor, was injured when the 1966 Triumph automobile in which she was a passenger, owned by Mary Ann Graves and operated by Ricky June Peery, collided with another vehicle. The automobile was insured under a policy of insurance issued to Graves by The Home Insurance Company. Peery was insured under a policy issued by The Hartford Insurance Company. These insurance companies petitioned the court under Code § 8.01-424 for approval of a compromise settlement of Rebecca's personal injury claim for $100,000, the maximum aggregate coverage under the policies.
Rebecca's parents and legal guardian answered, requesting that the settlement be approved; her guardian ad litem responded that the settlement was in her best interests. By order dated April 27, 1978, the court approved the settlement and ordered the release of the companies "from any and all further liability under their respective policies to the respondents herein for damages arising out of the accident."
In July 1982, Rebecca's guardian, Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, filed this action against the manufacturer of the automobile, the manufacturer of its wheels, and the dealer who sold the automobile to Graves,
The trial court conducted three evidentiary hearings, receiving testimony concerning the intent of the parties in reaching settlement and in releasing the insurance companies. Concluding that the settlement documents were ambiguous, the court considered the parol evidence and found that the parties intended the release of the companies also to release the insured driver, Peery. Relying on Perdue v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Prior to the enactment of Code § 8.01-35.1 in 1979, the rule of law in Virginia was that a release of one joint tortfeasor released all joint tortfeasors. Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 233 Va. 86, ___,
218 Va. at 120, 235 S.E.2d at 353 (emphasis in original).
Although this rule is stated with reference to the parties as "joint tortfeasors," its application to a particular case does not depend upon their relationship as joint tortfeasors. Shortt v. Hudson Supply, etc.,
166 Va. at 377, 185 S.E. at 874. In Shortt, the nature of a plaintiff's claim against one of the defendants was not ascertainable from the record, but we nevertheless found that the plaintiff had "a single claim" — "an indivisible cause of action for damages for his personal injuries arising out of the collision." Because his claim was for an indivisible injury, we held that, "in determining whether he has received satisfaction therefor and has released one of those responsible for the damage, it is immaterial whether those guilty of the wrongdoing were, strictly speaking, joint tortfeasors." 191 Va. at 309-10, 60 S.E.2d at 902-03.
In this case, the injuries complained of are those for which the compromise settlement provided compensation. Rebecca sustained injuries which, although they may have had more than a single cause, constituted a single indivisible injury. Her settlement with and release of the insurance companies and their insureds constituted an accord and satisfaction of her cause of action for her single indivisible injury. As such, this release also released all other parties allegedly responsible for her injuries.
Cauthorn asserts, however, that Rebecca's claim against the driver and her claim against the defendants represent two causes of action, one sounding in tort and the other in contract. Citing Katzenberger v. Bryan,
In Katzenberger, the plaintiffs, purchasers of real property, sued the sellers for breach of warranty of title after learning that a portion of the property conveyed was not owned by the sellers. The purchasers accepted settlement of this claim and released the sellers, then proceeded on a negligence theory against the lawyer who had certified incorrectly that the sellers were vested with good title to the property. Id. at 79, 141 S.E.2d at 672. The trial court held the second action barred by the release of the sellers, finding that there had been an accord and satisfaction. Id. at 80, 141 S.E.2d at 672. We reversed, concluding that the purchasers had not an indivisible cause of action but two separate and distinct causes of action, one in contract against the sellers and the other in tort against the lawyer. Id. at 84, 141 S.E.2d at 675.
Our decision, however, did not rest solely on the distinction between the theories of recovery; it was also based on the difference between the relief sought in the two actions. In either proceeding, the purchasers could have recovered the value of the portion of the property not conveyed and the diminution in the value of the residue caused by the loss of ingress and egress over the portion not conveyed. But a third element of damages was not common to both causes of action. The loss of the use of certain improvements to the property made by the purchasers was an item of consequential damages not available in the contract action against the sellers but recoverable in the tort action as proximately resulting from the negligence of the lawyer. Thus, the purchasers' damages were not identical in the two actions and did not arise from a single indivisible injury; therefore, their release of the sellers was not an accord and satisfaction of their claim against the lawyer.
POFF, J., concurs.
RUSSELL, J., joins in the concurring opinion.
POFF, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result. I do not disagree with the analysis the majority makes, but I favor a different rationale.
I would hold that an action for breach of warranty in a products liability case sounds in tort when the plaintiff claims damages for personal injury or damages for injury to property other than the product covered by the warranty. That holding would activate the rule at common law and, applied in this case, the plaintiff's release of the negligent driver would have released the negligent manufacturers and the automobile vendor as well.
I recognize that this Court has held that an action for breach of implied warranty of foodstuffs is an action ex contractu. Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc.,
8 Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 970 at 485-89 (3d ed. 1964) (footnotes omitted).
In a products liability case, the focus of the complaint is not upon a promise but upon a defect in the product. The purchaser claims damages for personal injury or damages for injury to property owned by the purchaser other than the product covered by the warranty. The purchaser alleges that his damages were the proximate result of his use of the defective product. At trial, the plaintiff attempts to show that the defect is the result of the manufacturer's negligence in design or production; that, because the manufacturer and the seller knew or should have known that the product was not fit for its intended use, they were guilty of misrepresentation which induced the consumer to purchase
As a general rule, actions founded upon a contract are subject to statutory time limitations different from those imposed upon actions sounding in tort. Compare Code § 8.01-243, which applies to tort actions generally, and Code § 8.01-246, which applies to "actions founded upon a contract". The general rule does not apply, however, "in products liability actions for injury to person and for injury to property, other than the property subject to contract". Code § 8.01-246. Thus, the General Assembly has determined that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, a breach of warranty claim in a products liability action sounds in tort; said differently, an action based upon a breach of warranty claim sounds in contract only when the damage claimed by the purchaser is the loss of his bargain with the seller.
The culpable conduct expressly or implicitly charged in a breach of warranty claim in a products liability case is negligence or misrepresentation and, in my view, all rules governing actions sounding in tort, whether procedural or substantive and whether invoked by the plaintiff or the defendant, should apply.
RUSSELL, J., joins in the concurring opinion.
- No Cases Found