WARNER, MARTHA C., Associate Judge.
Appellant, Steven Lusby, appeals the lower court's judgment adjudicating him guilty of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine, and sentencing him to fifteen years' imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently.
Appellant met Scott Kuffer, confidential informant for the Clearwater Police,
Kuffer testified that after the car convention and several telephone calls to the
Appellant was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. His defense to the action was entrapment.
In Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905, 105 S.Ct. 3527, 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), the supreme court adopted an objective threshold test for entrapment which supplements the traditional subjective doctrine. The threshold test requires the state to establish initially whether "police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond for the proper use of governmental power ..." Cruz, 465 So.2d at 520, quoting from Sherman v. U.S., 356 U.S. 369, 382, 78 S.Ct. 819, 825, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958).
In Cruz, the supreme court stated:
465 So.2d at 522.
The interruption of ongoing drug trafficking is a specific ongoing criminal activity sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the test. In the instant case, although the police did not know of the appellant or his codefendant, the confidential informant had information from the appellant himself that appellant had a friend who was a drug dealer and that appellant used drugs himself. Further, appellant and the informant conversed about amounts of drugs, appellant seemed familiar with drug jargon, and the confidential informant and appellant exchanged phone numbers to set up something in the future. Thus, the government could reasonably conclude that appellant, either together with his friend or by himself, was engaging in the ongoing sale of drugs.
This case differs from Marrero v. State, 478 So.2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). In Marrero, the defendant was recruited as a seller of marijuana, to be supplied by undercover agents. Thus, there was no interruption of ongoing criminal activity since the defendant had no history of drug involvement, and the government conduct in supplying the drug did not "facilitate discovery or suppression of ongoing illicit traffic in drugs." See U.S. v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir.1975). In the instant case it was appellant and his co-defendant who had the contacts to obtain illicit drugs. Thus, interrupting their ability to obtain and sell illicit drugs clearly falls within the first prong of the test.
We are concerned, however, that the confidential informant was on a "fishing expedition" in bringing up the topic of drugs to the defendant when the confidential informant had no reason to believe that appellant had any contact with illegal drugs whatsoever. We do not condone general forrays into the population at large by government agents to question at random the citizenry of this country to test
As to the second prong of the Cruz test, the activities of the police were not so extensive as to be characterized as outrageous. See Brown v. State, 484 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1986). The appellant admitted his drug use to the confidential informant and his acquaintance with a drug dealer. The confidential informant then called the appellant ten to fourteen times over the next ten days attempting to persuade the appellant to enter into a drug deal. There were no threats to appellant's personal safety, nor were there promises of exorbitant gain.
We find the remaining points to be without merit, and for the foregoing reasons we affirm the appellant's conviction and sentence.
ANSTEAD and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.