HAUGHT v. MACELUCHNo. 81-1103.
681 F.2d 291 (1982)
Roger HAUGHT and Delores Haught, individually and as next friends for their minor daughter, Jamie Marie Haught, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees,
John MACELUCH, M.D., Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant, and
William C. Martin, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.
John MACELUCH, M.D., Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant, and
William C. Martin, M.D., Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 26, 1982.
Rehearing and Rehearing Denied September 2, 1982.
Street, Swift, Brockermeyer, Bell & Ward, Kae L. Brockermeyer, Simon, Peebles, Haskell, Gardner & Betty, Anne Gardner, Fort Worth, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants cross-appellees. Glasgow & Jones, Robert J. Glasgow, Stephenville, Tex., Paul J. Van Osselaer, Austin, Tex., for William C. Martin, M.D. Cantey, Hanger, Gooch, Munn & Collins, Estil A. Vance, Jr., Sloan Blair, Richard L. Griffith, Fort Worth, Tex., for Maceluch.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, THORNBERRY and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied September 2, 1982.
THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:
In this medical malpractice suit, appellant Delores Haught claims that Dr. John J. Maceluch deviated from Texas' standards of sound medical practice in the delivery of her daughter, causing her daughter to suffer permanent brain injury. Appellant sued to recover damages for the impaired condition of her daughter, for medical expenses in connection with the child's birth and future care, for loss of the child's future earning capacity, and for appellant's own mental suffering over her daughter's impaired condition. The suit was filed under diversity jurisdiction in the Northern District of Texas, against Dr. Maceluch and Dr. William C. Martin, an alleged partner with Dr. Maceluch.
After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment of $1,160,000.00 for the child's medical expenses and $175,000.00 for her lost future earnings; the court deleted a jury award of $118,000.00 for appellant's mental suffering over her daughter's impaired condition. The court also refused recovery against Dr. Martin, although the jury had found him to be a partner by estoppel. Appellant now appeals the district court's deletion of her mental suffering damages and its refusal to hold Dr. Martin liable; Dr. Maceluch cross-appeals the jury verdict holding him liable for damages caused to the child by his alleged malpractice.
I. The Facts
The complicated facts of this tragedy began in Weatherford, Texas, when appellant was referred to Dr. Martin for an examination just prior to her marriage and again when she later became pregnant. Appellant visited Dr. Martin for two or three months during her pregnancy, until Dr. Martin referred her to Dr. Maceluch; thereafter,
On March 12, 1977, when the childbirth was eleven days overdue, Dr. Maceluch examined appellant, but sent her home after he found no dilation of the cervix. The next day, appellant went into labor: at 10:00 p. m. she began having pains about three or four minutes apart. Because Dr. Martin was out of the country, appellant called Dr. Maceluch, who told her to go to the Campbell Memorial Hospital in Weatherford. Appellant arrived at the hospital at 10:30 p. m., and hospital personnel immediately called Dr. Maceluch to report that her cervix was not dilated and that her contractions were four minutes apart and moderate. At this point, Dr. Maceluch felt no necessity to go to the hospital himself. Hospital personnel again called Dr. Maceluch at midnight to report that appellant's contractions were four to five minutes apart and irregular; Dr. Maceluch ordered the nurse to admit and prepare appellant, but he still decided not to go to the hospital.
At 3:00 a. m. appellant's amniotic membrane ruptured spontaneously. The hospital's night supervisor noted that the escaped fluid contained dark green meconium — that is, the matter excreted in the baby's first bowel movement. Meconium staining is a symptom of fetal distress, indicating a compromise or interruption of the baby's oxygen supply.
One hour later — at 4:00 a. m. — Dr. Maceluch called the hospital and ordered the nurses to place an external fetal heart monitor on appellant's stomach in order to measure the baby's heart rate. He also ordered the administration of a minimum dosage of Pitocin, a powerful drug used to stimulate a more regular labor contraction pattern; the Pitocin was supposed to induce labor, or to augment it, according to Dr. Maceluch. At 5:00 a. m. a nurse called Dr. Maceluch to report continued meconium staining and, in her reading of the external heart monitor, a loss of "beat to beat variability" in the relation of the fetal heartbeat to the appellant's contractions.
Dr. Maceluch finally arrived at the hospital at 7:00 a. m. He observed continued gross meconium staining, and because he felt some doubt about possible loss of beat to beat variability, he removed the external fetal heart monitor and placed a more accurate internal fetal heart monitor on the baby's head. He also ordered the Pitocin dosage to be doubled. After noting that appellant's cervix was still dilated only one centimeter and that the baby's head was not yet engaged in appellant's pelvis, Dr. Maceluch left appellant and proceeded to make his morning rounds to other patients.
At approximately 8:00 a. m. the nurses noted the first sure signs of fetal heart deceleration, although it is not clear that they informed Dr. Maceluch. At about the same time — beginning at 8:10 a. m. according to the hospital records — Dr. Maceluch started to perform an elective hysterectomy on another patient. In the middle of this operation, though, a nurse interrupted him to tell him of the changes in the fetal heart beat. At this point, Dr. Maceluch decided that he would have to perform a Caesarian section on appellant; he therefore ordered the nurse to stop administering Pitocin to appellant and to have her moved to an operating room. He then proceeded to finish the elective operation.
At 9:00 a. m. appellant's husband signed a permit allowing Dr. Maceluch to perform a Caesarian section on appellant. Appellant was moved into the operating room at 9:10 a. m. and placed under anaesthesia at 9:25 a. m. Dr. Maceluch, who had finished his other operation at 9:15, finally came to appellant's aid, beginning the Caesarian section at 9:26 a. m. and completing it with the delivery of Jamie Marie Haught two minutes later at 9:28 a. m.
Upon delivery, Dr. Maceluch noted that the umbilical cord was wrapped three or four times around the baby's neck; he also found gross meconium covering the baby's body and in the baby's throat. These conditions confirmed Dr. Maceluch's pre-operative diagnosis of fetal distress. A nurse immediately intubated the baby to draw the meconium from the throat. Although the baby then began to breath spontaneously and its color returned, it was not in good general condition: its breathing suffered some retractions, its physical functions were depressed, and it exhibited poor muscle tone. Because of these problems, the baby was transferred to Fort Worth Children's Hospital for further treatment.
A neonatologist at Fort Worth Children's Hospital diagnosed the baby as suffering from severe perinatal asphyxia — that is, a severe deprivation of oxygen before, during, or after birth — and from meconium aspiration syndrome — the distress caused by inhalation of meconium into the lungs. The baby also suffered seizures, indicating damage to the brain. And the baby's pH level was quite low, an acidotic condition often caused by oxygen deprivation. Even more tragically, within three months the baby's head had shrunk because of the atrophy of her brain. According to the neonatologist, the brain damage was permanent and would necessitate continuing institutionalization for the child. In short, Jamie Marie Haught was doomed to a life limited by extraordinarily severe handicaps.
II. Appellant's Mental Suffering
The most difficult issue that we must resolve in this case is whether appellant can recover for the mental anguish she suffered because of the birth of her child in a defective condition, as distinguished from appellant's suffering caused by the labor and delivery. The district court posed this question to the jury as follows:
The jury answered by awarding appellant $118,000.00 as compensation. The district court, however, deleted this award on the ground that Texas law would not permit such recovery by an "uninjured bystander." But because we think that the Texas Supreme Court would allow appellant to recover on the compelling facts of this case, we reverse the district court and reinstate the verdict of the jury.
A. The Texas Case Law
Of course, as a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction, we are bound to follow the substantive law of Texas as declared by its Supreme Court. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not yet rendered a decision that directly controls the "uninjured bystander" issue before us, it has decided cases relevant to the issue. In Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890), the Texas Supreme Court became one of the first courts to allow a plaintiff to recover for witnessing another's tortious conduct. The plaintiff in Hill suffered a miscarriage caused by a "strong emotion of the mind" when she witnessed the defendant's assault of two servants. The Court held the defendant liable under general negligence principles — that is, because the defendant's assault of the servants had been negligent toward the plaintiff. This basis for liability was a milepost in the law, since the prevailing rationale allowed recovery only when the defendant's actions were willful toward the bystander. See Hallen, Hill v. Kimball — A Milepost in the Law, 12 Texas L.Rev. 1, 14 (1934).
The Texas Supreme Court again allowed recovery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Hayter, 93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900). The plaintiff in Hayter suffered "traumatic neurasthenia" after the train in which he was riding collided with another train. The Court held that recovery would be permitted "provided the act or omission is the proximate cause of the injury, and the injury ought, in the light of all of the circumstances, to have been foreseen as a natural and probable consequence thereof." Id. at 242, 54 S.W. at 945. The decision did not discuss recovery by a bystander, but it did confirm the applicability of general negligence principles to cases involving the infliction of emotional distress.
The bystander problem finally received attention in the Texas Supreme Court decision of Kaufman v. Miller,
Further guidance on the circumstances that would justify recovery for a bystander's emotional suffering has had to come from the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals. The most recent cases, decided after the landmark California case of Dillon v. Legg,
The most direct application occurred in Landreth v. Reed,
Similarly, in Bedgood v. Madalin,
Again, in Newman v. Minyard Food Stores, Inc.,
This reading of the Texas case law clearly reveals that Texas will follow the modern rule of measuring bystander recovery according to the general negligence principle of foreseeability. The relevant Texas Supreme Court decisions have opened the door for such recovery, and the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals have generously accepted the invitation. Under these circumstances, we cannot refuse either; we must judge appellant's recovery in this case under the modern rule.
B. The Texas "Foreseeability" Test
While it is clear that Texas will allow bystander recovery to the extent that the bystander's injuries were foreseeable, it is less clear what the Texas courts mean when they use foreseeability as a test. We know only that the determination of foreseeability will depend on a number of factors and must be made on a case by case basis. See Kaufman v. Miller, supra, 414 S.W.2d at 168-71; Landreth v. Reed, supra, 570 S.W.2d at 489.
According to the Landreth court, three factors constitute the primary test for determining foreseeability. The court stated these factors as follows:
570 S.W.2d at 489. Accord Dillon v. Legg, supra,
68 Cal.2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 80. "In light of these factors the court will determine whether the accident and harm was reasonably foreseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular defendant as an individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that courts on a case-by-case basis, analyzing all of the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen." Id. at 741, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal.Rptr. at 81 (emphasis in original). In short, "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
C. Were Appellant's Injuries Foreseeable?
When we apply the appropriate factors to determine the foreseeability of appellant's mental suffering in this case, we can come to no different conclusion than that drawn by the jury. All three of the factors of the modern rule counsel for a finding of foreseeability, precisely as the jury found. The district court therefore erred in deleting appellant's damages for mental suffering; rather, the award compensating appellant for the foreseeable consequences of Dr. Maceluch's negligent conduct should be allowed to stand.
Quite clearly, the facts of this case satisfy the first and the third factors of the modern rule. Not only was appellant located near the scene of the accident, she was in some sense the scene itself. Dr. Maceluch's negligent conduct was visited upon her and upon the child within her body; no closer proximity can be imagined. And the appellant and the victim were closely related — indeed, as a mother and child in childbirth their relationship was unitary.
The difficult question arises from the second factor. The district court found that appellant had not "contemporaneously perceived" the accident and therefore that
Moreover, we think that the Texas courts would find appellant to have contemporaneously perceived the accident. The district court held otherwise because it found that appellant "did not witness or even know of any injury to her daughter at the time of defendant's negligent act." But this finding misstates the inquiry. The correct question turns on whether the plaintiff had "an experiential perception of [the accident], as distinguished from a learning of it from others after its occurrence." Landreth v. Reed, supra, 570 S.W.2d at 490. In other words, the inquiry should focus more on the plaintiff's experiential perception of the accident, not just the injury, and should measure that perception in comparison to learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. Using this formulation of the question, the Texas Supreme Court would, we think, find a contemporaneous perception by a mother who experiences a negligently inflicted childbirth.
Of course, in the typical "uninjured bystander" case, the plaintiff has in fact seen both defendant's negligent act and the injury that it causes to the third person; in these cases, the Texas courts have had little trouble concluding that the plaintiff contemporaneously perceived the accident. See Hill v. Kimball, supra, 76 Tex. at 215, 13 S.W. at 60 (plaintiff saw defendant beating two individuals); Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v. Newman, supra, 612 S.W.2d at 755 (plaintiff saw his wife's painful slip-and-fall accident).
Other "uninjured bystander" cases, though, do not present this simple eyewitness scenario; nevertheless, the Texas courts have been willing to find contemporaneous perception. In Bedgood v. Madalin, supra, 589 S.W.2d at 802-03, the Court of Civil Appeals found that a father had contemporaneously perceived the automobile accident that killed his son, even though the father was standing in his back yard when the accident occurred on the street in front of his house. The father testified that he heard a scream and a thud "like a watermelon being dropped from a great height" and that he then ran through his house out to the street where he saw his son fatally injured. The court had "no difficulty
In Landreth v. Reed, supra,
Using these cases and their standards as guides, we think that we can consider appellant here to have contemporaneously perceived the accident which befell her daughter. Appellant was certainly "brought so close to the reality of the accident as to render her experience an integral part of it." Indeed, this Court can imagine no more integral an experience than that of a mother giving birth to a child through a protracted and difficult labor and delivery. Appellant here was conscious during more than eleven hours of painful labor. She perceived that something was wrong, wrong enough to cause her to fear for her child's life. She was aware of Dr. Maceluch's negligent acts, particularly his absence in a near-emergency situation and his over-administration of a powerful drug which caused distress to herself and to her child. In short, appellant had an "experiential perception" of the accident. Cf. Krouse v. Graham,
Nor should the fact that appellant did not know the actual existence or extent of her child's injuries cause us to change this conclusion, lest we lose sight of the forest for the trees. Of course, the plaintiff's knowledge of the actual harm done to the third person will be a factor in favor of bystander recovery. But the ultimate test of recovery is the foreseeability of the plaintiff's emotional distress, which does not necessarily depend upon a single fact such as the plaintiff's contemporaneous perception of the injuries. Indeed, even in the typical "uninjured bystander" case the plaintiff often will not know the existence or extent of the victim's injuries. The mother who sees her child struck unconscious by a car does not know to any degree of medical certainty whether her child is actually injured; she knows only that an accident has befallen her child. Similarly here, appellant's disturbing experience informed her that some misfortune was happening to her child, causing her to fear for the child's life. Her distress, in other words, "resulted from a direct emotional impact upon [her] from a contemporaneous perception of the accident, as distinguished from learning of the accident from others after its occurrence." Landreth v. Reed, supra, 570 S.W.2d at 489.
III. Dr. Maceluch's Liability
We also agree with the jury that Dr. Maceluch should be held liable for all of the damages actually suffered by appellant and her child.
A. Standard of Medical Care
Before reaching the substance of Dr. Maceluch's argument, we note that the scope of our review of the district court's disposition of Dr. Maceluch's motions is limited. We will "consider all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion. We then must grant a motion for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. only if the facts and inferences favor the movant so overwhelmingly that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Schwartz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
The substance of Dr. Maceluch's claim depends upon the Texas rule regarding the standard of medical care against which Dr. Maceluch's conduct should be judged. The Texas rule reads as follows: "The burden of proof is on the patient-plaintiff to establish that the physician-defendant has undertaken a mode or form of treatment which a reasonable and prudent member of the medical profession would not have undertaken under the same or similar circumstances." Hood v. Phillips,
In addition, we think that evidence independent of Dr. Baugh's testimony was sufficient to establish the appropriate standards of medical care. Dr. Maceluch himself testified about the medical standard in March 1978 regarding the timing for performing a Caesarian section:
Dr. Maceluch thus established the proper standard from his own testimony, allowing the jury to find that he breached the standard by failing to recognize the two crucial factors early enough. Cf. Williams v. Bennett,
B. Proximate Cause
Even if, as we find, the jury considered evidence of the appropriate medical standard and properly found it to have been breached, we cannot hold Dr. Maceluch liable unless his breach proximately caused the injuries to appellant and her child. Dr. Maceluch argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove proximate cause and that the district court therefore should have granted his motions for judgment n.o.v. or for new trial.
Once again, we note that the scope of our review of the district court's denial of these motions is limited. As to the motion for judgment n.o.v., we will "consider all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion. We then must grant a motion for ... judgment n.o.v. only if the facts and inferences favor the movant so overwhelmingly that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Schwartz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, 669 F.2d at 1093. "As to the denial of a motion for new trial, absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the District Court's action." Bunch v. Walter,
The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to appellant, persuasively demonstrates that Dr. Maceluch's negligent conduct proximately caused the injuries to appellant and her child. Appellant's expert witnesses testified directly to that effect at trial. Two of these witnesses — Dr. Baugh and Dr. Heinz Eichenwald — specifically testified that during the childbirth appellant's child was undergoing current fetal distress, which Dr. Maceluch could have prevented by performing the Caesarian section earlier and could have lessened by not administering the Pitocin. Dr. Maceluch's expert witnesses testified otherwise, attacking the assumptions underlying the opinions of appellant's experts, but the jury chose not to believe them.
IV. Partnership by Estoppel
Finally, we must address appellant's claim against Dr. William C. Martin as a
The district court, which had carried Dr. Martin's objection to these questions, then sustained the objection for lack of pleadings to support the issue of partnership by estoppel. The court also refused to allow appellant to amend her pleadings under Rule 15 to include an allegation of partnership by estoppel.
Appellant naturally challenges the district court's refusal of leave to amend. Of course, we can overturn that refusal only if the district court abused its discretion. Addington v. Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co.,
Rule 15(b) mandates that "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment...." Thus, if appellant's issue of partnership by estoppel was tried by express or implied consent, the district court should have considered it raised by the pleadings and should have allowed amendment upon appellant's request. The question is whether the issue of partnership by estoppel was so tried. It is obvious that the parties did not expressly consent to try this issue. They did, however, impliedly consent to do so: appellant introduced evidence relating to the issue of partnership by estoppel as part of her case — without any objection from Dr. Maceluch or Dr. Martin — and at the close of her case she announced that she was including the issue as part of her legal theory. See Wallin v. Fuller,
As a general rule, we can find implied consent when a party fails to object to evidence relating to issues that are beyond the pleadings. See 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1493 at 462-65. This finding, though, depends on the circumstances of each case, and in this case, Dr. Martin urges that two factors should be considered especially important. First, he argues that the evidence relating to the theory of partnership by estoppel was also relevant to the legal partnership theory; thus, the evidence did not alert him to the introduction of a new theory outside of the pleadings. It is true that "the introduction of evidence relevant to an issue already in the case may not be used to show consent to trial of a new issue absent a clear indication that the party who introduced the evidence was attempting to raise a new issue." International Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck,
This unequivocally brought the new issue into the case with the awareness of all of the parties.
Dr. Martin then raises the second circumstance that he believes will prevent a finding of implied consent — namely, that the introduction of this new issue will prejudice him. See Wallin v. Fuller, supra, 476 F.2d at 1210 ("The possibility of prejudice to the opposing party may of course be reason to find a lack of consent to amendment under Rule 15(b)."). But we cannot see how any such prejudice could have occurred. Dr. Martin knew of appellant's new theory before he presented any of his evidence. And in fact, he testified at trial that he had never told anybody that he had a partnership with Dr. Maceluch; he stated three further times that he had never "represented" a partnership to appellant or to anyone else. Dr. Martin therefore had ample opportunity to prepare to meet the unpleaded issue, and he exercised that opportunity at trial. Under these circumstances, he was not prejudiced. Cf. C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1493 at 467-69. This Court is thus firmly convinced that the district court abused its discretion by not finding implied consent to the issue of partnership by estoppel.
Once the finding of trial by consent has been made, there remains no discretion to deny appellant's motion to amend. See C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 1493 at 469. In other words, the district court should have allowed the amendment as a matter of course. And even without the amendment, the issue of partnership by estoppel should be allowed to stand as the jury found it. Rule 15(b) specifically provides that issues tried by implied consent "shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings," and further "that failure ... to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." Because of this rule, we shall reinstate the finding of the jury that a partnership by estoppel existed between Dr. Martin and Dr. Maceluch as to appellant.
For all of the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM IN PART AND REVERSE IN PART.
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