MR. JUSTICE RYAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiffs, Oak Park Federal Savings and Loan Association and Oak Park Trust and Savings Bank, instituted a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Cook County against the defendant, the Village of Oak Park. The complaint prayed that the court declare invalid certain ordinances adopted by the defendant pursuant to home-rule powers granted by section 6 of article VII of the constitution of 1970. The defendant answered and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the court allowed. The plaintiffs appealed to the appellate court and we granted defendant's motion to transfer the appeal to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(b). (50 Ill.2d R. 302(b).) Subsection (l) of section 6 of article VII of the constitution of 1970 provides:
The plaintiffs contend that the defendant cannot, without enabling legislation adopted by the General Assembly, create a special service area or impose taxes or issue bonds to provide special services under section 6(l) of article VII. We agree with this contention. The somewhat unusual wording of section 6(l)(2) which requires clarification is as follows:
It is the italicized language quoted above which, on a casual reading, may appear to be in conflict and therefore requires our consideration. In the matter of constitutional construction, it is incumbent upon the court to give meaning to every section and clause of the instrument. If different parts of the constitution appear to be in conflict, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must favor a construction which will render every word operative rather than one which will make some words idle and nugatory. (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 128 (8th ed. 1927); 2 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, sec. 4705 (3d ed. 1943).) One clause will not be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to stand together. 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 129 (8th ed. 1927).
Although the first part of section 6(l) appears to command that the General Assembly not interfere with the home-rule power specified in this subsection, paragraph (2) of subsection (l) seems to require that the power be exercised only pursuant to a law adopted by the General Assembly. If we hold that the provisions of
However, by adopting a construction which requires the machinery and procedures for implementing this function to be established by law, while prohibiting the General Assembly from denying or limiting the exercise of the power, the two apparently conflicting provisions are harmonized. In keeping with the accepted principles of constitutional construction, this is the interpretation which must be given to this language.
The defendant contends that since the ordinance provides that the assessment of properties and the manner of levying taxes in the special service area shall be in the manner provided by the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 482 et seq.), the requirements of section 6(l)(2) have been satisfied. We are convinced that the language "in the manner provided by law" in this subsection of the constitution does not refer to the Revenue Act of 1939 but envisages specific enabling legislation directed to this section of the constitution. This method of taxation during the course of the constitutional debates was referred to as "differential" taxation. It was a new concept of taxation in Illinois. It was a departure from the requirement of uniformity of the 1870 constitution (Const. of 1870, art. IX, sec. 10), and its purpose was to authorize local-government units to tax different areas within their boundaries at different rates as the services furnished to those areas required. Section 10 of article IX of the 1870 constitution did not permit such differential taxation but required that the property within the municipal corporation be taxed uniformly. The Revenue Act of 1939, pursuant to this constitutional mandate, required that the tax rate for each taxing district be
The ordinances in question in this case are the ordinances of the Village of Oak Park, and under the Revenue Act of 1939, without further enabling legislation, the taxes levied by these ordinances are required to be extended against all of the property of the taxing district, which in this instance is the Village of Oak Park. The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1939 do not attempt to establish the statutory framework within which section 6(l)(2) can be implemented.
In the absence of enabling legislation, we hold that the five ordinances of the Village of Oak Park which attempt to exercise the home-rule powers of section 6(l)(2) of article VII of the constitution of 1970 are void.
MR. JUSTICE WARD, with whom MR. CHIEF JUSTICE UNDERWOOD and MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH join, dissenting:
Mr. Chief Justice Underwood, Mr. Justice Goldenhersh and I consider that the opinion of the majority in holding that home-rule units require enabling legislation in order to create special service areas and to tax for special services seriously contradicts an authority conferred on home-rule units by the constitution.
The majority not unreasonably begins by observing that it is incumbent upon the court to give meaning to every section and clause of the pertinent constitutional provisions, but, as we view it, it then proceeds to contradict and deny effect to sections 6(a), 6(g), 6(h) and 6(l). In doing so, it examines 6(l) in isolation and makes no reference to sections 6(a), 6(g), or 6(h).
When one examines section 6 (Powers of Home Rule Units) in its entirety, it can be seen that 6(a) is the source of a home-rule unit's powers. Making a grant of powers, it, as is pertinent here, declares:
It is clear that the constitutional drafters intended through section 6(a) to give home-rule units a comprehensive authority to provide for the government and affairs of a unit, subject, insofar as section 6 is concerned, to such restrictions as the drafters might insert thereafter in this section. The Report of the Committee on Local Government to the Constitutional Convention (p. 45) shows the breadth of the grant of powers to home-rule units. It said that the powers given under 6(a) "are designed to ensure that the specified counties and cities receive directly under the constitution the broadest possible range of powers to deal with problems facing them and with demands that are made upon them by their residents and by the greater society." (7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1619.) Reflecting the apprehension of the convention that judicial interpretation of powers might be unduly restrictive, the drafters, in an effort to make some of the most important home-rule powers invulnerable to judicial slighting, specified the powers of regulation, licensing, taxing and incurring debt. The Report observes at p. 48:
Following 6(a) is a series of paragraphs (c through k) which actually limit or authorize the General Assembly to limit the home-rule authority conferred in section 6(a).
That the constitutional drafters intended to preserve the home-rule powers referred to in 6(l) free from legislative restriction is evidenced also by the language of 6(g) and 6(h).
Section 6(g) states: "The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the members elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any other power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by the State other than a power or function specified in subsection (l) of this section." (Our emphasis.) The drafters in providing that the General Assembly by a three-fifths vote might limit or deny the power to tax and other powers or functions of the home-rule unit not exercised by the State specifically excepted the powers and functions specified in 6(l).
Section 6(h), also, in authorizing limitations on home-rule powers specifically excepted the home-rule powers and functions referred to in 6(l). Section 6(h) reads: "The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a taxing power or a power or function specified in subsection (l) of this Section." (Our emphasis.)
The majority makes no reference to the proceedings of the constitutional convention in forming its conclusion that the drafters of the constitution intended to make a home-rule unit's power to create special service areas and to tax for special services conditional under 6(l) upon the enactment of enabling legislation. It is not always easy to read, interpret and understand the flow and sometimes the mazes of the convention's proceedings, but we consider a careful study of the proceedings makes it apparent that the power to tax for special services was not made conditional. An examination of pages 3144, 3146, 4248, 4249 and 4450 of volumes IV and V of the Constitutional Proceedings (Verbatim Transcripts) is helpful in understanding the background to the preparation of 6(l). The majority proposal of the Committee on Local Government relative to "differential" and special service taxation (sec. 4.2) was referred to the Style, Drafting, and Submission Committee for revision. It was however "lost" for a time because of some confusion, but it was later submitted to the convention as section 6(e)(3) of the Style, Drafting, and Submission Proposal No. 15. As then presented, a home-rule unit would clearly have to have enabling legislation to
Mr. Chief Justice Underwood, Mr. Justice Goldenhersh and I consider that the language "in the manner provided by law" in (6)(l) is satisfied by the ordinance's provision that established procedures for the tax levy and assessment of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 482 et seq.) be utilized through application of section 9 of the constitution's Transition Schedule. (See Delegate Lennon's and Chairman Parkhurst's comments at 4 Proceedings 3143, 3144, and 5 Proceedings 4249.)
Apart from this, we judge that a home-rule unit could establish its own procedures, subject, of course, to meeting due-process and other constitutional requirements. A power to tax carries with it the authority to provide for necessary procedures.