OPINION BY JUDGE ROGERS, December 7, 1972:
Margaret A. Drevitch, widow of William R. Drevitch, has appealed from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County affirming an order of the Workmen's Compensation Board dismissing her Fatal Claim Petition.
Appellant's decedent, while employed as a milk truck driver for Beverly Farms, Inc., was struck on the chest on July 7, 1965 by milk cases which had apparently slipped from racks in his truck. Complaining of chest pains, Mr. Drevitch was examined by a cardiologist
William Drevitch filed a Petition for Compensation for Disability, which was pending at his death and upon which the Board eventually awarded his widow appropriate benefits. After his death, his widow filed the Fatal Claim Petition which is the subject of this appeal. The Referee awarded compensation to Mrs. Drevitch. On appeal, the Board initially set aside the Referee's award, but, upon Petition for Rehearing, remanded the case to the Referee ". . . for rehearing on all matters related to the causal connection between the accident and the disability and the subsequent death." After the rehearing the Board filed an opinion disallowing the Fatal Claim Petition on the following findings:
"Third: On July 7, 1965 the claimant suffered injuries to his chest as a result of the falling of milk crates while he was employed by the defendant delivering milk. The claimant also suffered an acute coronary occlusion either immediately before the time of the injury, or subsequent thereto. The decedent was disabled as a result of the coronary occlusion until September 20, 1965, when he returned to work and worked until October 10, 1965, when he suffered another coronary occlusion from which he died on December 6, 1965.
"Fourth: There is no causal connection between the accident of July 7, 1965 and the disability or death of William R. Drevitch."
The principles applicable here are clear. "`Questions of fact are for the compensation authorities and the appellate court may not make an independent appraisement of the evidence. Burman v. George J. Blair Company, 137 Pa.Super. 193, 8 A.2d 731. The Board is not required to accept even uncontradicted testimony as true and, where its decision is against the party having the burden of proof, the question before the court on appeal is whether the Board's findings of fact are consistent with each other and with its conclusions of law and order and can be sustained without a capricious disregard of the competent evidence.'" State Workmen's Insurance Fund v. Young, 2 Pa.Commw. 423, 427 (1971) (quoting with approval from Dindino v. Weekly Review Publishing Company, Inc., 188 Pa.Super. 606, 610, 149 A.2d 475, 477 (1959)). It is the prerogative of the Board as the ultimate factfinder to weigh the testimony and to accept or reject it either in whole or in part. The credibility of those qualified as medical experts is not reviewable as a matter of law, and the credibility of witnesses is of course for the factfinder. DeMascola v. Lancaster, 200 Pa.Super. 365, 189 A.2d 333 (1963). Compensation cannot be awarded without a finding of causality, and the power to make such a finding is exclusively vested in the compensation authorities. Gavandula v. Ryan Brothers, 205 Pa.Super. 325, 209 A.2d 13 (1965).
We agree with the Board and Judge LENCHER that the medical testimony adduced by the claimant was not of sufficient weight and clarity to sustain claimant's
In short, the medical testimony offered by claimant on the causal connection between the accident and decedent's death required a choice of inferences. ". . . [W]here the evidence presented is subject to several inferences, the inference to be adopted is for the board.. . ." Kline v. Kiehl, 157 Pa.Super. 392, 397, 43 A.2d 616, 618 (1945). We can find here on the part of this Board no capricious disregard of competent testimony, remembering that "[t]o constitute capricious disbelief there must be wilful, deliberate disbelief of an apparently trustworthy witness, whose testimony one of ordinary intelligence could not possibly challenge or entertain the slightest doubt as to its truth." Chilcote v. Leidy, 207 Pa.Super. 345, 349, 217 A.2d 764, 766 (1966).
The claimant has had two evidentiary hearings at the administrative level. Both attending physicians and an expert have testified in his behalf. Judge LENCHER made an unusually thorough study of the case and we have conscientiously reviewed the record. The claimant has been represented by very able and persistent counsel throughout. For us to remand, as claimant suggests, would, we are satisfied, impede rather than promote justice.