LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, in Equity.
The Board of Managers of the Firemen's and Policemen's Supplemental Pension System, appellees, brought a declaratory judgment action against the City of Birmingham, appellant, to test the constitutionality of Act No. 556, Acts of Alabama 1959. Said act establishes the supplemental pension system for firemen and policemen who are members of any pension and relief system, or retirement and relief system, heretofore established or hereafter established under Act No. 929, Acts of Alabama 1951, p. 1579, and for whose benefit, the city by which they are employed makes no contribution or pays no tax to the United States of America under the Federal Social Security Act. It is alleged that at the time said Act No. 556 was enacted, there was in existence and operation in the City of Birmingham a pension system established under Act No. 929; that there are certain firemen and policemen employed by the City of Birmingham who are members of the pension system established by said Act No. 929, for whose benefit the City of Birmingham has never made, and is not now making, any contributions or paying any tax to the United States of America under the Federal Social Security Act.
Sec. 6 of Act No. 556, Acts of Alabama 1959, p. 1376, contains the following provisions:
The court below found in favor of the appellees and that the City of Birmingham must pay. The city appealed, asserting that the said Act 556 is unconstitutional and in violation of Sec. 106 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901, in that the Act is a local act and not advertised as required, and further, that said Act violates Sec. 45 of the Constitution of Alabama, and that said Act is bad for double classification.
The title to Act No. 556 reads as follows:
In effect, Act No. 556 provides a supplemental pension and relief fund for firemen and policemen in cities of two hundred and fifty thousand or more inhabitants, and for whose benefit the city by whom they are employed makes no contribution or pays no tax to the United States of America under the Social Security Act.
This act is challenged as a local, not a general law, under Sec. 110 of the Constitution, and violative of Sec. 106, for want of published notice as therein required.
In passing upon the validity of the act in question, this court will, of course, indulge all presumptions and intendments in favor of its constitutionality, and will accord to the lawmaking body of the state government sincerity of purpose and fairness in dealing with the people of the state. And we will not assume that the population classification was arbitrarily fixed, but rather their action, in the given instance, was fairly taken and had for the purpose of meeting conditions, that it honestly thought existed, or might exist, in the larger and more populous cities of the state, See Wages v. State, 225 Ala. 2, 141 So. 707.
This court has long committed itself, in line with the holdings of other courts, to the proposition that population classification, made the basis for enactments, would be sustained in cases where there is a substantial difference in population, and the classification is made in good faith, reasonably related to the purpose to be effected and to the difference in population which forms the basis thereof, and not merely arbitrarily. Acts passed as general laws, based upon such population classification, and meeting the above test, are valid in that respect, although at the time of their enactment they can and do only apply to one county or city in the state. Wages v. State, supra; Opinion of the Justices, 270 Ala. 38, 115 So.2d 464; Smith v. Lancaster, 269 Ala. 579, 114 So.2d 568; Couch v. Rodgers, 253 Ala. 533, 45 So.2d 699; Reynolds, County Treasurer, v. Collier, 204 Ala. 38, 85 So. 465. But our cases make it equally clear that classification on a population basis cannot be made where the act presents a double classification or other limitations hedging it about so as to prevent its operation in all cities now or hereafter coming within the population classification or where future legislation is required to make the classification applicable to all cities. State ex rel. Shirley v. Lutz, 226 Ala. 497, 147 So. 429; Steber v. State, 26 Ala.App. 148, 155 So. 706, cert. den. 229 Ala. 88, 155 So. 708; Henry, County Treasurer, v. Wilson, 224 Ala. 261, 139 So. 259; Ward v. State, 224 Ala. 242, 139 So. 416; Jefferson County v. Busby, 226 Ala. 293, 148 So. 411; In re Opinion of the Justices, 256 Ala. 160, 53 So.2d 881.
We judicially know that at the present time the act is applicable only to the City of Birmingham. However, the question is: Can Act No. 556 apply to other cities which reach the named population without future legislation?
We are of the opinion that it can. As soon as a city reaches a population of two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) or more, they mandatorily come under Act No.
The appellant also argues that the designation and title "Personnel Board" and "Personnel Director" as found in Sec. 4 of Act No. 556 refers only to the personnel board and personnel director under civil service, and therefore since some cities over 250,000 may not have civil service, the said Act could not apply to every city having the said population.
This argument is not sound. One reason is that a city could have titles of "Personnel Board" and "Personnel Director" within their city government without having civil service. Also, if it should develop there is no such title or office of "Personnel Board" and "Personnel Director," then the principal governing body of the city may carry out the said provisions of Sec. 4 of Act No. 556. Act No. 929, supra, should be read in pari materia with Act No. 556, supra. In Sec. 4 of Act No. 929, Acts of Alabama 1951, p. 1583, "Personnel Board" is defined as "The board of control of any civil service system provided for the City by Statute, or, if at any time there be no such board of control, the principal governing body of the City." "Personnel Director" is defined as "The personnel director provided for the City by statute, or, if there be no such personnel director, the city clerk, the custodian or another as the Board may determine." Also, the Board of Managers under its general powers to control and manage the system, under Act No. 556, could appoint persons to perform the duties required. Therefore, the reference in Sec. 4 of Act No. 556 to "Personnel Board" and "Personnel Director" does not restrict the act to only cities which have civil service.
Appellant also argues that Act No. 556 violates Sec. 45 of the Constitution of Alabama which requires that the subject of an act be clearly expressed in its title.
In construing Sec. 45 of the Constitution of Alabama, this court has held that where there is a fair expression of the general subject of the act in its title, all matters reasonably related to it, including all necessary agencies or instrumentalities which facilitate the act's execution, are proper to be included as being cognate or germane to the title. Kendrick v. Boyd, 255 Ala. 53, 51 So.2d 694; Norton v. Lusk, 248 Ala. 110, 26 So.2d 849; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84, 173 So. 864; Woco Pep Co. of Montgomery v. Butler, 225 Ala. 256, 142 So. 509. The subject dealt with by the act is a supplemental pension system. Our judgment is that the subject is single and clearly expressed, that the title and the provisions embodied in the act are germane and cognate to the subject of the law.
Appellant also contends that Act No. 556 is void for uncertainty and indefiniteness.
It is, therefore, our considered opinion that Act No. 556 is a general law and that published notice of the act was not required, also that Act No. 556 is not void for uncertainty, nor does it violate Sec. 45 of the Constitution of Alabama 1901.
The ruling and decree of the lower court is due to be affirmed.
All the Justices concur.