Appeal from a decree overruling demurrer to bill for injunctive relief. Complainants are Leon Lindsey and Garde Mutual Insurance Company and respondents are Lt. George C. Wallace of the Department of Public Safety, Floyd Mann, Director of Public Safety, Mrs. Agnes Baggett, Treasurer of the State of Alabama, Frances Lindsey Woods and her attorney, Ramon L. Farnell, Lehman Morgan, Jr., and his attorney, L. H. Walden.
The bill shows that complainant Leon Lindsey suffered damage to his automobile in a collision in 1957 with a vehicle driven by Lehman Morgan, Jr., and complainant Garde Mutual Insurance Company, his insurer, was subrogated to his right upon payment for the damages. The subrogee then made efforts to collect from Morgan. Morgan had deposited security equivalent to the actual amount of complainants' property damages, i. e., $250, with the Department of Public Safety under the provisions of Section 5 of the Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act, General Acts of Alabama 1951, p. 1224, listed in the cumulative pocket part as Tit. 36, § 74(46).
Complainant Garde Mutual Insurance Company, through its attorney, reached an agreement with Morgan's attorney for the payment of its subrogation claim.
Frances Lindsey Woods, a passenger in Leon Lindsey's automobile, obtained a judgment against Lehman Morgan, Jr., in October, 1958, for injuries she suffered in the same collision.
The bill then alleges:
The prayer of the bill sought a temporary injunction against Lt. George C. Wallace, Director Floyd Mann and State Treasurer Baggett restraining them "from making any disbursements or in any way disposing of said security deposited by said Lehman Morgan, Jr. pending further order of this Court; and will further enjoin Respondents Lehman Morgan, Jr., L. H. Walden, Frances Lindsey Woods and Ramon L. Farnell or their heirs, assigns, successors or purchasers in interest from withdrawing any funds deposited with the State of Alabama as security for damages growing out of the above accident of February 10, 1957; that upon a final hearing in this cause your Honors will award security heretofore filed by Lehman Morgan, Jr. with the State of Alabama to your Complainants for satisfaction of their judgment for property damages to the automobile belonging to Leon Lindsey."
The court overruled the appellants' demurrers and issued the temporary restraining order pending further order of the court upon a full hearing of the merits. Respondents Wallace, Mann and Baggett appealed.
The one assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling respondents' demurrers to the bill of complaint. This assignment is sufficient, but under such assignment, we treat only those grounds of demurrer insisted on in brief of appellant as having been well taken. Hutto v. Copeland, 265 Ala. 482, 92 So.2d 30.
Section 2(a) of the Safety-Responsibility Act provides as follows:
Section 10 of the Act provides, in part, as follows:
Section 1(b) defines "judgment" as:
Ground 8 of the demurrer reads:
Appellants argue that this action is premature because the bill shows on its face the complainants recovered their judgment on January 22, 1959, and their bill was filed four days later, while the Act does not give the Department of Public Safety any power or discretion over the security until the time for appeal has expired. The bill shows on its face that the judgment was obtained in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County and the defendants in that action would have six months in which to appeal. Tit. 7, § 788, Code 1940. We think this ground of demurrer was good and should not have been overruled.
Other grounds of demurrer argued are that there is no equity in the bill and that for aught appearing, appellants are going to comply with appellees' wishes. We have held that if the relief sought is preventive, there must be a state of affairs which actually threatens and calls for present relief. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104 So.2d 827.
Certain it is that there is no allegation of a denial of any request or demand, or that it had ever been conveyed to appellants prior to suit that appellees would like for the security to be withheld or that appellants have threatened or even hinted that it would be disposed of. There is no allegation that appellants had any knowledge of appellees' suit or judgment prior to the filing of the bill in this cause. There is no allegation as to what appellants may do unless restrained.
A case in point is Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 208 Ala. 185, 94 So. 94, 95, where it was said:
Other cases holding that the action of a governmental agency acting within its authority, where there is no charge that their action was arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent, will not be controlled or directed by injunction are Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist., 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256; Goodwin v. State Board of Administration, 212 Ala. 453, 102 So. 718; Long v. Shepherd, 159 Ala. 595, 48 So. 675.
The bill here is without equity and a bill without equity will not support an injunction of any character under any circumstances. Kimbrough v. Hardison, 263 Ala. 132, 81 So.2d 606, and cases there cited.
The decree of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
SIMPSON, STAKELY and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.