In this action for a preliminary and permanent injunction certain children of the white race, together with their parents, seek to restrain the enforcement, operation and execution of Sections 22-188.3, 22-188.4, 22-188.5, 22-188.6, 22-188.7, 22-188.8, 22-188.9, 22-188.10, 22-188.11, 22-188.12, 22-188.13, 22-188.14, and 22-188.15 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended by the Acts of Assembly, Extra Session, 1956, and the Acts of Assembly, 1958. The statutes in question have been referred to by counsel as the "massive resistance" laws. As stated by defendants in their brief, the statutes are all a part of an overall effort or plan of the General Assembly to deal with the problems created by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, and its impact upon the social, economic, and political conditions existing in Virginia as related to the children of this state.
The defendants are the Chief Executive and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia, as well as the individual members of the School Board of the City of Norfolk, the Division Superintendent of Schools, and the School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, a body corporate.
As injunctive relief is sought against certain officers of the state, a three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.
The background of this litigation may be obtained by a casual reference to certain documents introduced in evidence and a study of the proceedings in the case of Beckett v. School Board of City of Norfolk, Virginia, Civil Action No. 2214, which has been pending in this court since May, 1956, and in which numerous orders have been entered and appeals taken
At the conclusion of the numerous proceedings and appeals in Beckett, the matter was again before the district court on the individual applications of 151 Negro children for admission into public schools previously attended solely by white children. The School Board initially denied all applications for admissions as filed by Negro children, assigning as reasons for such action that (1) the presence of one or two Negro children among a large number of white pupils would create among the Negroes an injurious "sense of isolation," (2) the peculiar circumstances would involve "racial conflicts and grave administrative problems," (3) many of the applicants were scholastically not eligible for considerations of transfer, and (4) as to a limited few Negro pupils, while otherwise qualified, they would be subjected to another transfer in September, 1959, because of a new school to be constructed in the area and "too frequent" transfers are not conducive to proper education. The district judge upheld the Board's reasoning in denying requests for transfer as to pupils classified in the latter two groups, but held that a "feeling of isolation" and "possible racial tension" did not constitute sufficient legal grounds to deny admission to the children otherwise qualified. The Board was then requested to reconsider all of the applications and report to the court; the district judge at all times refraining from making any specific assignments. The members of the School Board, acting in compliance with the law of the land as construed by the United States Supreme Court and as fully explained to them by the district judge, finally reported that seventeen Negro children would be assigned to certain public secondary schools of the City of Norfolk which had previously been attended only by children of the white race
As the opening of all public schools in the City of Norfolk had been postponed by action of the School Board until September 29, 1958, in order to obtain a final ruling from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the six schools referred to have never opened for the 1958-59 school year. Since September 27, 1958, the only activity permitted has been such as was specifically authorized by the Governor
What has happened to the 9,900 white children in the interim? Between 4,200 and 4,500 children are enrolled in various tutoring groups being held in private homes and churches, where they are receiving stopgap instruction in certain basic courses under the guidance of teachers; ninety percent of whom are public school teachers under contract to teach in the six closed schools and whose contractual obligations have purportedly been assumed by the State pursuant to § 22-188.14 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended
The plight of the school children and the teaching personnel who would have been in attendance at the six schools has been adequately described as "tragic." Children who would be in their last year of high school are at a loss as to what to do, and those who had planned to attend college are completely frustrated. The value of a high school diploma is freely recognized, even as to such children who may be admitted to college on examination and without a diploma. Children not having reached the twelfth grade are equally uncertain as to their future. While the record does not reflect the reaction of the children attending other public schools in Norfolk now in operation, it is a proper assumption that at least some of these students and their parents must realize that their schools could be closed at any moment.
In this state of confusion the teachers under contract in the closed schools have endeavored to assist as a temporary measure. But they likewise must look to the future. The morale is at a low ebb; they do not know when, if ever, they will resume the noble profession of educating the youth of Virginia, to which they have dedicated their lives. While their contracts are apparently protected until June 30, 1959, they have no assurance that their services will be renewed for the next succeeding school year. Aside from the financial remuneration they receive, the teachers express the desire to teach in public schools—not merely to assist in some private tutoring group. The testimony points to a feeling of unrest and insecurity among all of the teachers; they are here today, but they will undoubtedly be gone tomorrow unless they are assured with respect to the future. If the teachers leave for a more certain field of endeavor, the public of Norfolk will lose and, even if we were to assume that private tutoring groups would and could continue, the teaching source of supply would be so limited that only a scattered number of children could receive this type of education.
In this setting we approach the statutes under consideration. The adult plaintiffs are all taxpayers and citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia. With the exception of four adult female plaintiffs, all adult plaintiffs are taxpayers of the City of Norfolk. A portion of the public funds of the state derived from taxation of the adult plaintiffs and other citizens of Virginia is used and applied in the maintenance and operation of the free public school system of Virginia. It is unnecessary for us to discuss the rather complicated formula used by the state in determining the amount allocated for the purpose of public school education in each county and city throughout the state. In some counties the percentage of the total budget for public education received from the state will be as high as seventy percent. In the City of Norfolk the percentage of state contribution is slightly in excess of twenty-three percent. By reason of the large number of federally-connected children in Norfolk, the federal government contributes approximately twelve percent of the total budget of $10,354,406.
We are not unmindful of the difficulties confronting Virginia and other Southern States following the Brown decision of May 17, 1954. It is not for us to pass upon the wisdom of state legislation, but it is our duty to apply constitutional principles in accordance with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and when state legislation conflicts with those constitutional principles, state legislation must yield. Irrespective of what may be said by those in public life, we are gratified to note that counsel for the defendants, including the Attorney General of Virginia, concede that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are not only binding upon this court, but also constitute the law of the land. If there ever existed any room for doubt as to the controlling force of the principles of law enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873; Id., 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083, these doubts were effectively removed
In Cooper v. Aaron, supra, we find the following apt statement:
Tested by these principles we arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the Commonwealth of Virginia, having accepted and assumed the responsibility of maintaining and operating public schools, cannot act through one of its officers to close one or more public schools in the state solely by reason of the assignment to, or enrollment or presence in, that public school of children of different races or colors, and, at the same time, keep other public schools throughout the state open on a segregated basis. The "equal protection" afforded to all citizens and taxpayers is lacking in such a situation. While the State of Virginia, directly or indirectly, maintains and operates a school system with the use of public funds, or participates by arrangement or otherwise in the management of such a school system, no one public school or grade in Virginia may be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the land as interpreted by the Supreme Court, while the state permits other public schools or grades to remain open at the expense of the taxpayers. In so holding we have considered only the Constitution of the United States as it is unnecessary, in our opinion, to pass upon the specific provisions of the Constitution of Virginia which deal directly with the free public school system of the state. We do not suggest that, aside from the Constitution of Virginia, the state must maintain a public school system. That is a matter for state determination. We merely point out that the closing of a public school, or grade therein, for the reasons heretofore assigned violates the right of a citizen to equal protection of the laws and, as to any child willing to attend a school with a member or members of the opposite race, such a school-closing is a deprivation of due process of law. It follows, therefore, that the defendants must be permanently enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce the statutes in question as the same may apply to the public schools of the City of Norfolk.
We need only turn back the pages of history to 1899 to find authority for our statement that these plaintiffs are being denied the equal protection of the laws. When we examine Cumming v. Board of Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, 542-545, 20 S.Ct. 197, 201, 44 L.Ed. 262, and interpret the same in light of the more recent Brown and Cooper cases, we find abundant reasoning for our conclusions. The Cumming case arose in Georgia where a Board of Education, having previously maintained a public high school for the benefit of sixty colored children, elected temporarily to do away with the particular high school and operate, in its stead, a primary school serving three hundred Negro pupils who would otherwise be without the benefit of an education. The evidence disclosed that the Board was without the necessary
In the instant proceeding the six schools are closed solely because of resistance to the law of the land as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The underlying reason is, of course, the mixing of races in these schools by the School Board's assignment of seventeen Negro children into schools previously attended only by white pupils. The plaintiffs thereupon became a class created by reason of the operation of the massive resistance statutes. They, together with the seventeen Negro children, are the subjects of discrimination and are unable to obtain the benefits of public taxation on the same basis as the parents of other children similarly situated. The statutes and the action of the defendants thereunder manifestly constitute a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
In the event the State of Virginia withdraws from the business of educating its children, and the local governing bodies assume this responsibility, the same principles with respect to equal protection of laws would be controlling as to that particular county or city. While the county or city, directly or indirectly, maintains and operates a school system with the use of public funds, or participates by arrangement or otherwise in the management of such a school system, no one public school or grade in the county or city may be closed to avoid the effect of the law of the land while other public schools or grades remain open at the expense of the taxpayers. Such schemes or devices looking to the cutoff of funds for schools or grades affected by the mixing of races, or the closing or elimination of specific grades in such schools, are evasive tactics which have no standing under the law.
We cannot agree with defendants' argument that the closing of these schools constitutes a "temporary" delay in operation. Defendants presented no evidence and did not suggest when, if ever, the schools would be reopened, or as to what steps, if any, were being taken by the Governor to accomplish this purpose. Indeed, Chapter 68 of the Acts of Assembly, Extra Session, 1956, as amended by the Acts of Assembly, 1958, provides that any school in which children of both races are enrolled shall be closed and shall not be reopened as a public school until, in the opinion of the Governor and after investigation by him, he finds and issues an executive order that (1) "the peace and tranquility of the community in which the school is located will not be disturbed by such school being reopened and operated," and (2) "the assignment of pupils to such school could be accomplished without enforced or compulsory integration of the races therein contrary to the wishes of any child enrolled therein, or of his or her parent or parents, lawful guardian or other custodian." Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, § 22-188.6. If we were to assume the validity of this statute, it would certainly be chimerical to conclude that the Governor could ever order a reopening of any of the six schools where an effective objection may be registered by any one parent of a child scheduled to attend the school in question. There are a large number of Virginians who are determined that
Nor is any relief afforded by § 22-188.12 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, wherein it is provided that the closed school or schools shall become a part of the public school system of the political subdivision in which the school is located upon a certificate of the school board and board of supervisors of the county or council of the city. It should be noted that this statute, as originally enacted in 1956, made it mandatory upon the Governor to proclaim the closed school as a part of the public school system of the political subdivision upon certification of either the school board or the local governing body. The amendment to this statute in 1958 effectively closed the door when it vested in the Governor the discretion to make the necessary proclamation by changing the wording "shall so proclaim" to "may so proclaim" and by further providing that both the school board and the governing body of the county or city must join in the certificate addressed to the Governor. Aside from the 1958 amendment, the statute clearly violates the rights of citizens under the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. It directly violates the statement in Brown where it is said:
We are told that, because the schools are closed to all alike, both white and colored, there is no discrimination and hence there is no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This premise is totally unsound. The discrimination here complained of is the denial of the right of white children to attend public schools which are closed by action of the Governor pursuant to an unconstitutional law enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, while other white children living in the same state, and within the same political subdivision, are enjoying the educational opportunities afforded them at the expense of all taxpayers, including the parents of the white children locked out of the six schools. We need hardly discuss the factor of race to arrive at the conclusion that this is not equal protection of laws. Equality of treatment is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161. As was said in Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 825-826, 70 S.Ct. 843, 847, 94 L.Ed. 1302:
Where a state or local government undertakes to provide public schools, it has the obligation to furnish such education to all in the class eligible therefor on an equal basis. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208. As the United States Supreme Court has ruled out any classification by race as a condition of eligibility, it follows that all eligible children must be accorded equal treatment with respect to admission or attendance in public schools, subject to reasonable rules and regulations disassociated with racial questions. The plaintiffs herein, and the class they represent, are not being accorded education on an equal basis.
The first contention is that this is an action against the Commonwealth of Virginia and, therefore, cannot be maintained by reason of the provisions of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States which prescribes:
Despite the wording of the amendment, it has been held that the federal courts are without power to entertain a suit by a citizen of a particular state when instituted against the state of the plaintiff's citizenship. Hans v. State of Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 524, 19 S.Ct. 269, 43 L.Ed. 535; Duhne v. State of New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313, 40 S.Ct. 154, 64 L.Ed. 280; Ex parte State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 41 S.Ct. 588, 65 L.Ed. 1057.
Defendants readily concede that state officials, including the Governor and Attorney General, are not immune from suit brought to prevent their acting under color of authority, purported to be given to them by an unconstitutional enactment, in such a manner as to infringe the constitutional right of individuals. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S.Ct. 190, 77 L.Ed. 375; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620, 32 S.Ct. 340, 56 L.Ed. 570; Ferris v. Wilbur, 4 Cir., 27 F.2d 262; Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 5 Cir., 242 F.2d 156, 160; School Board of City of Charlottesville v. Allen, 4 Cir., 240 F.2d 59. Defendants cite in support of their contention a line of authorities such as Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 8 S.Ct. 164, 31 L.Ed. 216; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 6 S.Ct. 608, 29 L.Ed. 805; Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 64 S.Ct. 873, 88 L.Ed. 1121; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 327 U.S. 573, 66 S.Ct. 745, 90 L.Ed. 862; Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, 694, 66 S.Ct. 219, 90 L.Ed. 140; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389; Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628; State of Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 22 S.Ct. 650, 46 L.Ed. 954; O'Neill v. Early, 4 Cir., 208 F.2d 286; and Fleming v. Upper Dublin Public School District, D.C., 141 F.Supp. 813. We have reviewed these cases and find that affirmative state action was held to be required in each instance. The language in Ex parte Ayers must be considered in conjunction with the later case of Ex parte Young. In the Annotated Constitution of the United States of America, published pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 69, approved June 17, 1947, 61 Stat. 133, we find (p. 933):
The test is correctly stated in the recent case of Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University & Agricultural & Mechanical College v. Ludley, 5 Cir., 252 F.2d 372, 375, wherein an amendment to the Louisiana State Constitution specified certain state officials as "special agencies of the State of Louisiana," and withheld the consent of the State to be sued through any action against such officials. In holding that the suit was not one against the State, the court said:
It would perhaps be sufficient to answer defendants' argument by referring to the second Brown decision, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083, where it is said that all provisions of federal, state or local law requiring or permitting such racial discrimination in public education are unconstitutional and any such laws must yield to this principle. As the statutes in question effectively require a continuance of racial discrimination, they are patently unconstitutional. Aside from the foregoing, however, the short answer is that this court, while holding the statutes unconstitutional, is not directing the reopening of the schools. We merely hold that the Governor's proclamation of September 27, 1958, closing the schools was predicated upon an unconstitutional statute and hence is void. The injunction to be issued will simply prohibit the defendants, and all other persons in active concert or participation with defendants who receive or have notice or knowledge of the injunctive order, from in any manner, directly or indirectly, taking any steps in pursuance of the unconstitutional statutes here involved. The effect of this injunction will be tantamount to restoring to the School Board its rights, duties and obligations which existed prior to the enactment of the unconstitutional statutes, including, of course, its obligation to comply with the order of this court heretofore entered on February 26, 1957, in the Beckett case. The decree to be entered will not restrain the Commonwealth of Virginia in any sense of the word—it will only prevent the defendant state officials and others from endeavoring to enforce the package of unconstitutional laws designed for the purpose of defeating the "law of the land" as expressed in Cooper v. Aaron, supra [358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1410].
What we have just said is abundant authority for denying the motion to dismiss the School Board as a party defendant, as well as holding that this is not an action against the Commonwealth of Virginia. The School Board may not attempt to enforce these unconstitutional acts any more than the Governor or Attorney General. Neither the Board, the other defendants, nor any persons in active concert or participation with defendants, including, of course, the local governing bodies, may resort to evasive schemes which are discriminatory or are designed to evade the court orders. The Board is clearly a proper and necessary party to the proceeding.
As to the motion to dismiss the Attorney General of Virginia, it is our view that he is also a proper party, although undoubtedly not what may be classified as a necessary party. He is the chief law enforcement officer of the Commonwealth. While he is given no specific statutory duties under the statutes in controversy, he is nevertheless charged with the enforcement of the laws of Virginia. To the end that there will be no misunderstanding of our ruling that the questioned statutes are unconstitutional as in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, we conclude that the Attorney General is a proper party to this proceeding and should be included
An order has this day been signed by the resident judge directing a further hearing for the purpose of considering the form of decree to be entered in this cause.
(a) D.C., 148 F.Supp. 430—an opinion by District Judge Hoffman holding the Pupil Placement Act (Chapter 70, Acts of Assembly, Extra Session, 1956) unconstitutional on its face.
(b) School Board of City of Newport News, Virginia v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325— An opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirming the action of the district judge in ruling the Pupil Placement Act unconstitutional, and in enjoining the defendants from discriminating, solely on account of race or color, in admitting, assigning, or enrolling children to the public schools of the City of Norfolk.
(c) 355 U.S. 855, 78 S.Ct. 83, 2 L.Ed. 2d 63—The United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in the aforesaid case.
(d) School Board of City of Norfolk v. Beckett, 260 F.2d 18—The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the action of District Judge Hoffman in declining to grant a further delay of one year, as requested by the School Board, to comply with the order of the district court previously entered on February 26, 1957, enjoining the School Board from discriminating solely by reason of race or color.
Maury High School 1 Negro child Granby High School 1 Negro child Norview High School 7 Negro children Northside Junior High School 1 Negro child Blair Junior High School 2 Negro children Norview Junior High School 5 Negro children
"Under compulsion of an order issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, both white and colored children have been enrolled effective September 29, 1958, in Granby, Maury and Norview High Schools and Blair, Northside and Norview Junior High Schools, located in the City of Norfolk.
"Pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 9.1, Title 22, of the Code of Virginia, the above-named schools are closed and are removed from the public school system, effective September 29, 1958, and all authority, power and control over such schools, principals, teachers and other employees and all pupils now enrolled or ordered to be enrolled, will thereupon be vested in the Commonwealth of Virginia, to be exercised by the Governor.
"Accordingly, by virtue of the authority vested in me as chief executive of the Commonwealth of Virginia, I will thereupon assume all power and control over such schools and hereby request all local officials and all citizens to cooperate with the Department of State Police and local law enforcement officials in the protection of public property and the security of public peace and order.
"You are requested to forthwith notify all teachers, and other personnel connected with such schools, and all parents and other persons having custody and care of all pupils enrolled in such schools, of this action.
"Given under my hand this 27th day of September, 1958.