Appellee, Enoch King, sued appellant, Woodward Iron Company, a corporation, for workmen's compensation allegedly due Enoch for permanent partial disability suffered by him during his employment by appellant. The particular disability allegedly sustained by Enoch was that he had contracted occupational pneumonoconiosis compensable under the Act of the Legislature approved June 29 1951, 1951 Acts, page 426, Pocket Parts, 1940 Code of Alabama, Title 26, §§ 313(1)-313(16). The trial court found that plaintiff had "a permanent partial disability due solely to occupational pneumonoconiosis in the amount of 17½ per cent" and awarded compensation accordingly. Appellant seeks review by certiorari.
The contentions of the employer are stated in brief as follows:
As we understand the rule of review by certiorari in workmen's compensation cases, the only question now before us is whether or not the conclusions of the trial court are supported "on any reasonable view of the evidence" found in the record. This court has said:
As to whether or not Enoch was actually suffering from occupational pneumonoconiosis, the evidence is in direct conflict. Dr. Joseph Welden, for the plaintiff, testified in pertinent part as follows:
Dr. Kellie N. Joseph, for the defendant, testified that his diagnosis was negative "for any silicosis, or occupational pneumonoconiosis on present findings," and was negative "for any definite lung disease on present findings." Dr. Joseph said further that the X-ray of Enoch's chest did not show any nodules indicating silicosis; that Enoch's real trouble was "hypertensive cardiovascular disease," and "As far as his
Colvert v. Alabama By-Products Corporation, D.C., 115 F.Supp. 493, cited by appellant, involved questions similar to the ones here. The trial court there concluded that plaintiffs had failed to carry the burden of proof because the X-rays failed to show nodulation. While that case may be persuasive authority to a trial court weighing the evidence in the first instance, the situation is different where, as here, the question on review is to determine, not the weight of the evidence, but whether or not a determination already made by the trial court is sustained on any reasonable view of the evidence.
We cannot say there was no reasonable view of the evidence on which the trial court could conclude that Enoch did have occupational pneumonoconiosis.
Enoch had been employed by appellant for a total of eighteen years. The first eleven years he worked underground in coal mines. Appellant's arugment further is that during the last seven years of his employment Enoch had been employed on the surface, not underground, and during those seven years was not exposed to a hazard of occupational pneumonoconiosis which was greater than the hazards of such disease attending employment in general. This contention is based on testimony to the effect that samples of air taken in and about the places where Enoch last worked on the surface showed that the hazard to which he was there exposed, in so far as pneumonoconiosis is concerned, was no greater than the hazard from air found on the streets and in the courtrooms in Bessemer and Birmingham.
We are not persuaded, however, that there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support the court's finding that Enoch's employment did subject him to a greater hazard in that respect than is to be found in employment in general. Without undertaking to set out all the evidence, we note that plaintiff spent "probably about 40 per cent of his time" unloading rock dust, which contained 1.80 per cent silica, that the rock dust was unloaded from inside a boxcar, that "you couldn't hardly see when you got to fooling with that * * * rock dust," that after unloading the dust workmen were covered with it, that plaintiff also did work in and about loading dry sand which was composed of 40 to 70 per cent silica, and that there was some dust from this sand although the sand dust was not as great in amount as the rock dust.
After considering the entire record, we are of opinion there was sufficient legal evidence to support the findings of the trial court and that the judgment appealed from is due to be affirmed.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.