This is a condemnation proceeding brought by the state pursuant to Code 1940, Tit. 19, Chap. 1, to acquire, for public highway purposes (§ 14, Tit. 19), certain land belonging to Grady Loftin, appellee, located in Lee County. The land is to be used in the construction of U. S. Highway No. 29, a part of the new interstate highway system. The proceeding originated in the probate court of Lee County, where the commissioners assessed damages and compensation in the amount of $10,250 and an order of condemnation was made pursuant thereto. The state appealed from said order to the circuit court of Lee County where a trial de novo (§ 17, Tit. 19) was had before a jury. The jury returned a verdict fixing the amount of damages and compensation at $7,000. Judgment and an order of condemnation followed. Appellee then filed a motion for a new trial. Among the grounds assigned in support of the motion are several taking the point that the verdict of the jury was not sustained by the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The trial court granted the motion, from which ruling the state brings this appeal.
Section 276, Tit. 7, supra, sets out certain causes for granting a new trial. Among them is the following: "That the verdict or decision is not sustained by the great preponderance of the evidence." Two of the cases cited by the trial court dealt with orders granting new trials on the ground that the verdict failed to do justice between the parties which, as recognized in those cases, is a common law cause for granting a new trial. We have held that the causes enumerated in § 276, supra, are not the exclusive causes for granting a new trial; that "courts of record have inherent power independent of the statute to set aside and vacate their orders or judgments within the term and for common-law causes." Batson v. State, 216 Ala. 275, 113 So. 300, at page 302; Harrison v. Baker, 260 Ala. 488, 71 So.2d 284; Birmingham Electric Co. v. Yoast, 256 Ala. 673, 57 So.2d 103, 30 A.L.R.2d 907; Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp. v. Cahela, 251 Ala. 163, 36 So.2d 513; Parker v. Hayes Lumber Co., 221 Ala. 73, 127 So. 504; Equitable Finance Co. v. Burns, 220 Ala. 559, 126 So. 885.
It is to be noted that the trial court, in citing § 276, did not specify which of the statutory grounds it thought justified its ruling. In this situation we will, on review here, "indulge the presumption that it was because the trial court concluded that the verdict was contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence or that the verdict was unjust in the light of the evidence." Romano v. Thrower, 258 Ala. 416, 417, 63 So.2d 369, at page 370; Chisom v. Woodward Iron Co., 265 Ala. 212, 213, 90 So.2d 816; Birmingham Electric Co. v. Greene, 252 Ala. 40, 39 So.2d 398; Camp v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 251 Ala. 184, 36 So.2d 331; Hyde v. Norris, 250 Ala. 518, 35 So.2d 181. The rule is thus stated in Chisom v. Woodward Iron Co., supra [265 Ala. 212, 90 So.2d 817]:
As to the other ground on which the trial court undoubtedly based its ruling (failure of the verdict to do justice between the parties), we quote the following from Parker v. Hayes Lumber Co., supra [221 Ala. 73, 127 So. 504]:
Also see: German-American Wholesale Optical Co. v. Rosen, 233 Ala. 105, 106, 170 So. 211.
After carefully considering the evidence, we cannot say that it plainly and palpably supports the verdict and that the trial
We have not discussed the evidence in this opinion "for fear its consideration on another trial may be prejudiced, however careful the language of discussion." Parker v. Hayes Lumber Co., supra [221 Ala. 73, 127 So.2d 505]; Frost v. Johnson, 256 Ala. 383, 386-387, 54 So.2d 897; German-American Wholesale Optical Co. v. Rosen, supra.
The judgment appealed from is due to be affirmed.
LAWSON, STAKELY and MERRILL, JJ., concur.