We granted the writ in the instant case because the cases cited in the opinion of the Court of Appeals do not appear to support the conclusion of that court.
Hudson v. State, 249 Ala. 372, 31 So.2d 774, is merely a "trail case," with facts dissimilar to the facts here. Moreover, that is a possession case and could not be authority for the absence of proof of the corpus delicti insofar as the distilling count is concerned.
Milam v. State, 24 Ala.App. 403, 136 So. 831, admittedly must be distinguished in order to keep it from being in conflict with the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Martin, 33 Ala.App. 502, 36 So.2d 535, is concerned with the construction of the word "establishment" in our Unemployment Compensation Act, Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 180 et seq. That case is not in point.
In Bolin v. State, 266 Ala. 256, 96 So.2d 582, 588, the majority opinion distinguishes that case from cases dealing with the "making, possession and transportation, etc., of illegal liquors or beverages."
It is obvious that the cases cited in the opinion of the Court of Appeals are not apt authority.
The correct rule in possession cases is stated in Rikard v. State, 31 Ala.App. 374, 18 So.2d 435, certiorari denied 245 Ala. 677, 18 So.2d 436:
Elmore v. State, 21 Ala.App. 410, 109 So. 114, states the law as to both distilling and possession in this language:
The still was in operation at the time of defendant's arrest, and all the facts were sufficient to raise an inference that petitioner was engaged in, or aiding and abetting in, the distilling operation. We think the evidence outlined in the opinion of the Court of Appeals is sufficient to make a jury question under either count of the indictment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON, SIMPSON, GOODWYN and COLEMAN, JJ., concur.