MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was filed in the Court of Claims by petitioner, a resident of the Philippines, to recover just compensation for the requisitioning by Philippine guerrilla forces
On July 26, 1941, pursuant to the Philippine Independence Act,
Thereafter on April 26, 1951, more than six years after the last alleged requisition, this action was filed in the United States Court of Claims. The Government moved to dismiss on several grounds, including (1) that the statutory limitation period had run, and (2) that the units were part of the Philippine forces for which the United States was in no manner responsible. In a per curiam order, 133 Ct. Cl. 971, after issue was drawn on the pleadings, the Court of Claims dismissed the suit on the authority of Logronio v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 596, 133 F.Supp. 395 (1955). In effect, this reaffirmed its earlier holdings that members of the guerrilla units of the Philippine Army were not part of the Army of the United States.
We granted certiorari, 351 U.S. 917, to determine the validity of the claims of the petitioner and others in like position. After issuance of the writ in this case, the Court of Claims in Compania Maritima v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. ___, 145 F.Supp. 935 (1956), held that a Philippine resident seeking redress against the United States was under a legal disability while hostilities
Petitioner urges that his suit was timely filed because he was first required to present his claim to the Army Claims Service before he could prosecute the action in the Court of Claims. This administrative procedure, he points out, was not exhausted until June 21, 1948, and this suit was filed on April 26, 1951, less than three years thereafter. But, if he should fail with this contention, he argues that the war suspended the running of the statute and it was, therefore, tolled until September 2, 1945, when hostilities ceased with Japan. We cannot agree with either contention.
It has been settled since Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123 (1883), that the Congress in creating the Court of Claims restricted that court's jurisdiction. In Kendall this Court held that the Congress in the Act creating the Court of Claims gave the Government's consent to be sued therein only in certain classes of claims and that no others might be asserted against it, including "claims which are declared barred if not asserted within the time limited by the statute." Id., at 125. As to the latter cases, jurisdiction was given only over those filed "within six years after such claim first accrues," unless the claimant was "under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues," in which event suit must "be filed within three years after the disability ceases." 62 Stat. 976, 28 U. S. C. § 2501. As was said in Kendall, supra, "The court cannot superadd to those enumerated . . . ," it having "no more authority to engraft [another] disability
Petitioner asserts that his action did not accrue until the denial of the claim by the Army Claims Service. At the same time, he admits that the claim filed there was based on the alleged delivery of supplies, etc., on the promise of future payment. The claim, if allowed, was against the Philippine Government, not the United States.
We now reach petitioner's second contention. The cause of action as alleged by petitioner was for just compensation for supplies, etc., taken from him by guerrillas during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. He alleges in his complaint that the action, if any he has, accrued at the time of the taking and could only be maintained within six years thereafter but for the existence of the hostilities which he claims tolled the statute. He depends on Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532 (1868), to support this position. Such reliance is misplaced. That case involved private citizens, not the Government. It has no applicability to claims against the sovereign. See Haycraft v. United States, 22 Wall. 81 (1875).
To permit the application of the doctrine urged by petitioner would impose the tolling of the statute in every time-limit-consent Act passed by the Congress. For example, statutes permitting suits for tax refunds, tort actions, alien property litigation, patent cases, and other claims against the Government would all be affected. Strangely enough, Congress would be required to provide expressly in each statute that the period of limitation was
We are not unmindful that the enforcement of this rule might result in hardship in some cases, and perhaps frustrate the expectations of some Philippine citizens who in good faith supplied recognized guerrilla units. Such considerations are not for us, as this Court can enforce relief against the sovereign only within the limits established by Congress. Petitioner here had six years within which to act. He filed no claim whatever until after the expiration of three years from the date he alleges the last taking occurred. This claim was filed with the Army Claims Service on the basis of an alleged contract. That claim was denied within less than three months after it was filed. This left petitioner over two and a half years additional time to pursue his just compensation remedy. Still he did nothing for almost three years, when he filed this suit in the Court of Claims. By that time his claim, on any theory, was barred by statute. The judgment is therefore.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concur, dissenting.
If petitioner had sued in the Court of Claims without first presenting his claim to the Army Claims Service, I
The statutory scheme for payment of the expenses of the guerrilla forces, therefore, demonstrates that this claim, if it can be sustained on the merits, runs against the United States. The fact that approved claims were paid by the Philippine Government is a mere administrative detail. For it acted in this respect only as a disbursing agency for the United States.
Hence petitioner properly first presented his claim to the Army Claims Service, which rejected it June 21, 1948. The six-year statute should be held to run from that date. For it is the general rule that, where a claim must first be processed by an administrative agency, it does not accrue until the agency refuses payment. See United States v. Taylor, 104 U.S. 216, 222. Cf. United States v. Clark, 96 U.S. 37, 43-44.
That was the view of the Court of Claims in an earlier case involving such a problem. See Dino v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 307. I think the Court of Claims position in the Dino case is the correct one.
"Every claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed, or the claim is referred by the Senate or House of Representatives, or by the head of an executive department within six years after such claim first accrues.
"A petition on the claim of a person under legal disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be filed within three years after the disability ceases."
"(12) The Philippine Islands recognizes the right of the United States to expropriate property for public uses, to maintain military and other reservations and armed forces in the Philippines, and, upon order of the President, to call into the service of such armed forces all military forces organized by the Philippine government." Id., at 457.
". . . I hereby call and order into the service of the armed forces of the United States for the period of the existing emergency, and place under the command of a General Officer, United States Army, to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time, all of the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . ."
"That the word `enemy,' as used herein, shall be deemed to mean, for the purposes of such trading and of this Act—
"(a) Any individual, partnership, or other body of individuals, of any nationality, resident within the territory (including that occupied by the military and naval forces) of any nation with which the United States is at war, or resident outside the United States and doing business within such territory, and any corporation incorporated within such territory of any nation with which the United States is at war or incorporated within any country other than the United States and doing business within such territory."